Trader consensus reflects an 83.5% implied probability against a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee agreement by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral negotiations amid contentious conditions. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy recently stated on March 24 that talks continue but require resolution on guarantee terms, following his January claim of a "100% ready" document that has not materialized. Fresh reports from March 25 indicate the U.S. links guarantees to Ukraine withdrawing from unoccupied Donbas areas—a condition Zelenskyy rejected as dangerous—while Senator Rubio dismissed related claims on March 27, emphasizing no U.S. troop commitments. With a NATO summit set for June 24-26 as a potential venue, significant hurdles in duration, ratification, and territorial concessions sustain skepticism among traders wagering on diplomatic timelines.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data · UpdatedU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by June 30?
$128,297 Vol.
$128,297 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
$128,297 Vol.
$128,297 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus reflects an 83.5% implied probability against a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee agreement by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral negotiations amid contentious conditions. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy recently stated on March 24 that talks continue but require resolution on guarantee terms, following his January claim of a "100% ready" document that has not materialized. Fresh reports from March 25 indicate the U.S. links guarantees to Ukraine withdrawing from unoccupied Donbas areas—a condition Zelenskyy rejected as dangerous—while Senator Rubio dismissed related claims on March 27, emphasizing no U.S. troop commitments. With a NATO summit set for June 24-26 as a potential venue, significant hurdles in duration, ratification, and territorial concessions sustain skepticism among traders wagering on diplomatic timelines.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Market Opened: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
Volume
$128,297End Date
Jun 30, 2026Market Opened
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus reflects an 83.5% implied probability against a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee agreement by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral negotiations amid contentious conditions. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy recently stated on March 24 that talks continue but require resolution on guarantee terms, following his January claim of a "100% ready" document that has not materialized. Fresh reports from March 25 indicate the U.S. links guarantees to Ukraine withdrawing from unoccupied Donbas areas—a condition Zelenskyy rejected as dangerous—while Senator Rubio dismissed related claims on March 27, emphasizing no U.S. troop commitments. With a NATO summit set for June 24-26 as a potential venue, significant hurdles in duration, ratification, and territorial concessions sustain skepticism among traders wagering on diplomatic timelines.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$128,297End Date
Dec 31, 2026Market Opened
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus reflects an 83.5% implied probability against a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee agreement by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral negotiations amid contentious conditions. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy recently stated on March 24 that talks continue but require resolution on guarantee terms, following his January claim of a "100% ready" document that has not materialized. Fresh reports from March 25 indicate the U.S. links guarantees to Ukraine withdrawing from unoccupied Donbas areas—a condition Zelenskyy rejected as dangerous—while Senator Rubio dismissed related claims on March 27, emphasizing no U.S. troop commitments. With a NATO summit set for June 24-26 as a potential venue, significant hurdles in duration, ratification, and territorial concessions sustain skepticism among traders wagering on diplomatic timelines.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data · Updated
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