Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects low implied probability for Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, 2025, driven by mutual deterrence following Israel's limited strikes on Iranian military sites on October 26, 2024, after Tehran's October 1 missile barrage. Iran's responses have since channeled through proxies like Hezbollah amid escalating Lebanon border clashes and Houthi Red Sea attacks, avoiding direct confrontation amid U.S. sanctions and economic pressures. Key uncertainties include potential nuclear negotiations and post-January 20 U.S. inauguration policy shifts under incoming President Trump, alongside IAEA monitoring of Iran's uranium enrichment. Upcoming events like UN Security Council sessions could signal de-escalation or escalation risks.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado$2,871,512 Vol.
Saudi Arabia
87%
UAE
91%
Bahrain
85%
Iraq
80%
Jordan
35%
Oman
20%
Azerbaijan
6%
Siria
6%
Turquía
5%
Pakistán
3%
Chipre
3%
Armenia
2%
Reino Unido
2%
Yemen
2%
Afganistán
2%
Germany
2%
Hungary
2%
Ukraine
2%
France
1%
Georgia
1%
Italy
1%
Spain
1%
Poland
1%
India
1%
$2,871,512 Vol.
Saudi Arabia
87%
UAE
91%
Bahrain
85%
Iraq
80%
Jordan
35%
Oman
20%
Azerbaijan
6%
Siria
6%
Turquía
5%
Pakistán
3%
Chipre
3%
Armenia
2%
Reino Unido
2%
Yemen
2%
Afganistán
2%
Germany
2%
Hungary
2%
Ukraine
2%
France
1%
Georgia
1%
Italy
1%
Spain
1%
Poland
1%
India
1%
For the purposes of this market, a qualifying "strike" is defined as the use of aerial bombs, drones or missiles (including cruise or ballistic missiles) launched by Iranian military forces that impact a listed country's ground territory or any official embassy or consulate of that country (e.g., if a weapons depot on a listed country soil is hit by an Iranian missile, this market will resolve to "Yes").
Missiles or drones which are intercepted and surface-to-air missile strikes will not be sufficient for a "Yes" resolution regardless of whether they land on a listed country's territory or cause damage.
Strikes within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, will be counted as Israel.
Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory, will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market.
Actions such as artillery fire, small arms fire, FPV or ATGM strikes directly, ground incursions, naval shelling, cyberattacks, or other operations conducted by US or Israeli ground operatives will not qualify.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
If the date/time of a strike cannot be confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting by the end of the third calendar date after this market's end date, it will resolve to "No" regardless of whether a strike was later confirmed to have taken place.
Mercado abierto: Mar 17, 2026, 1:17 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects low implied probability for Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, 2025, driven by mutual deterrence following Israel's limited strikes on Iranian military sites on October 26, 2024, after Tehran's October 1 missile barrage. Iran's responses have since channeled through proxies like Hezbollah amid escalating Lebanon border clashes and Houthi Red Sea attacks, avoiding direct confrontation amid U.S. sanctions and economic pressures. Key uncertainties include potential nuclear negotiations and post-January 20 U.S. inauguration policy shifts under incoming President Trump, alongside IAEA monitoring of Iran's uranium enrichment. Upcoming events like UN Security Council sessions could signal de-escalation or escalation risks.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado
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