Trader consensus favors Mojtaba Khamenei at 61% to remain Iran's Supreme Leader by end-2026, driven by his official appointment on March 8 following Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's death in US-Israeli airstrikes, as announced by state media and endorsed by regime loyalists including the IRGC. This swift succession by the Assembly of Experts amid heightened escalation underscores institutional continuity despite external pressures. Recent rumors of Mojtaba's injury or relocation for treatment—fueled by his limited public appearances—have spurred speculation, with Iranian officials and Russian media denying severity, yet trimming his odds from higher peaks. Reza Pahlavi's 9% reflects bets on opposition-led regime change via unrest or further military actions, while low probabilities for reformists like Rouhani highlight entrenched hardliner dominance. Ongoing conflict dynamics and potential IRGC power plays could shift probabilities before resolution.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado¿Líder de Irán a finales de 2026?
¿Líder de Irán a finales de 2026?
Mojtaba Khamenei 61.2%
Reza Pahlavi 9%
Hassan Rouhani 5.8%
Masoud Pezeshkian 4.7%
$5,943,205 Vol.
$5,943,205 Vol.
Mojtaba Khamenei
61%
Reza Pahlavi
9%
Hassan Rouhani
6%
Masoud Pezeshkian
5%
Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf
5%
Sin Jefe de Estado
3%
Hassan Khomeini
2%
Abbas Araghchi
2%
Sadegh Larijani
1%
Alireza Arafi
1%
Maryam Rajavi
1%
Ahmad Vahidi
<1%
Muhammad Mirbaqiri
<1%
Mohammad Khatami
<1%
Ali Asghar Hejazi
<1%
Navid Shomali
<1%
Saeed Jalili
<1%
Hassan Shariatmadari
<1%
Massoud Rajavi
<1%
Seyed Hossein Mousavian
<1%
Reza Pirzadeh
<1%
Mustafa Hijri
<1%
Ali Motahari
<1%
Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel
<1%
Mostafa Pourmohammadi
<1%
Sadegh Mahsouli
<1%
Mahmoud Ahmadineyad
<1%
Mohsen Araki
<1%
Nasir Hosseini
<1%
Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani
<1%
Mojtaba Khamenei 61.2%
Reza Pahlavi 9%
Hassan Rouhani 5.8%
Masoud Pezeshkian 4.7%
$5,943,205 Vol.
$5,943,205 Vol.
Mojtaba Khamenei
61%
Reza Pahlavi
9%
Hassan Rouhani
6%
Masoud Pezeshkian
5%
Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf
5%
Sin Jefe de Estado
3%
Hassan Khomeini
2%
Abbas Araghchi
2%
Sadegh Larijani
1%
Alireza Arafi
1%
Maryam Rajavi
1%
Ahmad Vahidi
<1%
Muhammad Mirbaqiri
<1%
Mohammad Khatami
<1%
Ali Asghar Hejazi
<1%
Navid Shomali
<1%
Saeed Jalili
<1%
Hassan Shariatmadari
<1%
Massoud Rajavi
<1%
Seyed Hossein Mousavian
<1%
Reza Pirzadeh
<1%
Mustafa Hijri
<1%
Ali Motahari
<1%
Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel
<1%
Mostafa Pourmohammadi
<1%
Sadegh Mahsouli
<1%
Mahmoud Ahmadineyad
<1%
Mohsen Araki
<1%
Nasir Hosseini
<1%
Ahmad Hosseini Khorasani
<1%
For the purposes of this market, “de facto holds” refers to the individual who exercises primary governing authority over the Iranian state at that time, including effective control over the armed forces, national institutions, and core executive decision-making, regardless of formal title, constitutional designation, or international recognition.
Formal appointment, recognition by the United Nations, or recognition by foreign governments is not required.
If more than one individual claims to be head of state, this market will resolve to the individual who demonstrably exercises primary governing control within Iran’s territory at the specified time.
Indicators of de facto authority may include control over the armed forces and security services; control over executive ministries and state administrative institutions; enforcement of national laws; issuance of binding national directives; and effective control over the capital and core state infrastructure.
Symbolic status, foreign recognition without domestic control, nomination without effective authority, or expired prior service will not qualify.
If no individual exercises effective governing control at the specified time, this market will resolve to “No Head of State”.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting assessing who exercises effective governing authority at the specified time.
Mercado abierto: Feb 28, 2026, 7:12 PM ET
Resolver
0x69c47De9D...For the purposes of this market, “de facto holds” refers to the individual who exercises primary governing authority over the Iranian state at that time, including effective control over the armed forces, national institutions, and core executive decision-making, regardless of formal title, constitutional designation, or international recognition.
Formal appointment, recognition by the United Nations, or recognition by foreign governments is not required.
If more than one individual claims to be head of state, this market will resolve to the individual who demonstrably exercises primary governing control within Iran’s territory at the specified time.
Indicators of de facto authority may include control over the armed forces and security services; control over executive ministries and state administrative institutions; enforcement of national laws; issuance of binding national directives; and effective control over the capital and core state infrastructure.
Symbolic status, foreign recognition without domestic control, nomination without effective authority, or expired prior service will not qualify.
If no individual exercises effective governing control at the specified time, this market will resolve to “No Head of State”.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting assessing who exercises effective governing authority at the specified time.
Resolver
0x69c47De9D...Trader consensus favors Mojtaba Khamenei at 61% to remain Iran's Supreme Leader by end-2026, driven by his official appointment on March 8 following Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's death in US-Israeli airstrikes, as announced by state media and endorsed by regime loyalists including the IRGC. This swift succession by the Assembly of Experts amid heightened escalation underscores institutional continuity despite external pressures. Recent rumors of Mojtaba's injury or relocation for treatment—fueled by his limited public appearances—have spurred speculation, with Iranian officials and Russian media denying severity, yet trimming his odds from higher peaks. Reza Pahlavi's 9% reflects bets on opposition-led regime change via unrest or further military actions, while low probabilities for reformists like Rouhani highlight entrenched hardliner dominance. Ongoing conflict dynamics and potential IRGC power plays could shift probabilities before resolution.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Preguntas frecuentes