Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects low implied probability for Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, driven by mutual deterrence after Israel's targeted strikes on Iranian assets and proxies, including the September 2024 killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Iran's preference for indirect pressure through Hezbollah rocket barrages and Houthi Red Sea disruptions has limited escalation since its April 2024 drone-missile barrage, which Israel largely intercepted with US aid. Recent US intelligence warnings of potential Iranian retaliation remain unfulfilled amid Gaza ceasefire talks. Upcoming Trump administration policies and IAEA nuclear talks could further reduce risks, though proxy flare-ups or Israeli preemption might shift dynamics.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要 · 更新于$2,175,185 交易量
Qatar
100%
UAE
95%
Saudi Arabia
92%
Kuwait
91%
Bahrain
89%
Iraq
79%
Jordan
46%
土耳其
9%
Azerbaijan
8%
黎巴嫩
7%
叙利亚
6%
塞浦路斯
5%
巴基斯坦
4%
Armenia
4%
英国
3%
阿富汗
3%
也门
3%
Spain
3%
France
3%
印度
3%
Germany
3%
Georgia
2%
Poland
1%
Italy
1%
Hungary
<1%
Ukraine
<1%
Oman
54%
$2,175,185 交易量
Qatar
100%
UAE
95%
Saudi Arabia
92%
Kuwait
91%
Bahrain
89%
Iraq
79%
Jordan
46%
土耳其
9%
Azerbaijan
8%
黎巴嫩
7%
叙利亚
6%
塞浦路斯
5%
巴基斯坦
4%
Armenia
4%
英国
3%
阿富汗
3%
也门
3%
Spain
3%
France
3%
印度
3%
Germany
3%
Georgia
2%
Poland
1%
Italy
1%
Hungary
<1%
Ukraine
<1%
Oman
54%
For the purposes of this market, a qualifying "strike" is defined as the use of aerial bombs, drones or missiles (including cruise or ballistic missiles) launched by Iranian military forces that impact a listed country's ground territory or any official embassy or consulate of that country (e.g., if a weapons depot on a listed country soil is hit by an Iranian missile, this market will resolve to "Yes").
Missiles or drones which are intercepted and surface-to-air missile strikes will not be sufficient for a "Yes" resolution regardless of whether they land on a listed country's territory or cause damage.
Strikes within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, will be counted as Israel.
Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market.
Actions such as artillery fire, small arms fire, FPV or ATGM strikes directly, ground incursions, naval shelling, cyberattacks, or other operations conducted by US or Israeli ground operatives will not qualify.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
If the date/time of a strike cannot be confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting by the end of the third calendar date after this market's end date, it will resolve to "No" regardless of whether a strike was later confirmed to have taken place.
市场开放时间: Feb 28, 2026, 11:33 AM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...已提议结果: 是
无争议
最终结果: 是
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects low implied probability for Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, driven by mutual deterrence after Israel's targeted strikes on Iranian assets and proxies, including the September 2024 killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Iran's preference for indirect pressure through Hezbollah rocket barrages and Houthi Red Sea disruptions has limited escalation since its April 2024 drone-missile barrage, which Israel largely intercepted with US aid. Recent US intelligence warnings of potential Iranian retaliation remain unfulfilled amid Gaza ceasefire talks. Upcoming Trump administration policies and IAEA nuclear talks could further reduce risks, though proxy flare-ups or Israeli preemption might shift dynamics.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要 · 更新于
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