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How many ships will Iran successfully target by March 31?

Market icon

How many ships will Iran successfully target by March 31?

<5 96%

5–7 2.8%

8–10 <1%

11–13 <1%

Polymarket

$50,231 交易量

<5 96%

5–7 2.8%

8–10 <1%

11–13 <1%

Polymarket

$50,231 交易量

<5

$21,976 交易量

96%

5–7

$5,713 交易量

3%

8–10

$3,640 交易量

1%

11–13

$2,890 交易量

1%

14–16

$5,125 交易量

1%

17–19

$2,680 交易量

<1%

20+

$8,208 交易量

<1%

This market will resolve based on the number of distinct commercial vessels on which Iranian forces conduct a kinetic strike or otherwise seize control between market creation and March 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Attacks on military vessels will not be considered. Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory, will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market. Missile/drone strikes targeting a ship that are intercepted or otherwise do not directly impact the vessel will not be considered, regardless of damage through debris. Qualifying incidents include, but are not limited to, drone and missile strikes, aerial bombings, and kinetic actions carried out by Iranian operatives in person, such as seizing a ship by force. The primary resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus overwhelmingly favors fewer than five ships successfully targeted by Iran by March 31 (95.5%), reflecting the absence of any verified Iranian military actions against commercial vessels in the Red Sea or Strait of Hormuz over the past 30 days. While Iran-backed Houthi militants have conducted sporadic attacks on shipping amid Gaza tensions, Tehran has limited its role to rhetorical support and proxy coordination, avoiding direct naval strikes that could provoke escalated U.S. or allied retaliation, including recent U.S.-UK airstrikes on Houthi targets. Diplomatic signals from Iranian officials emphasize restraint amid ongoing nuclear talks and sanctions pressures. Scenarios that could shift odds include a sudden Hormuz Strait closure, unclaimed missile barrages, or retaliatory escalation following U.S. naval deployments, though historical patterns show Iran prefers asymmetric proxy actions over overt targeting.

Trader consensus overwhelmingly favors fewer than five ships successfully targeted by Iran by March 31 (95.5%), reflecting the absence of any verified Iranian military actions against commercial vessels in the Red Sea or Strait of Hormuz over the past 30 days. While Iran-backed Houthi militants have conducted sporadic attacks on shipping amid Gaza tensions, Tehran has limited its role to rhetorical support and proxy coordination, avoiding direct naval strikes that could provoke escalated U.S. or allied retaliation, including recent U.S.-UK airstrikes on Houthi targets. Diplomatic signals from Iranian officials emphasize restraint amid ongoing nuclear talks and sanctions pressures. Scenarios that could shift odds include a sudden Hormuz Strait closure, unclaimed missile barrages, or retaliatory escalation following U.S. naval deployments, though historical patterns show Iran prefers asymmetric proxy actions over overt targeting.

基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要 · 更新于
This market will resolve based on the number of distinct commercial vessels on which Iranian forces conduct a kinetic strike or otherwise seize control between market creation and March 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Attacks on military vessels will not be considered. Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory, will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market. Missile/drone strikes targeting a ship that are intercepted or otherwise do not directly impact the vessel will not be considered, regardless of damage through debris. Qualifying incidents include, but are not limited to, drone and missile strikes, aerial bombings, and kinetic actions carried out by Iranian operatives in person, such as seizing a ship by force. The primary resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus overwhelmingly favors fewer than five ships successfully targeted by Iran by March 31 (95.5%), reflecting the absence of any verified Iranian military actions against commercial vessels in the Red Sea or Strait of Hormuz over the past 30 days. While Iran-backed Houthi militants have conducted sporadic attacks on shipping amid Gaza tensions, Tehran has limited its role to rhetorical support and proxy coordination, avoiding direct naval strikes that could provoke escalated U.S. or allied retaliation, including recent U.S.-UK airstrikes on Houthi targets. Diplomatic signals from Iranian officials emphasize restraint amid ongoing nuclear talks and sanctions pressures. Scenarios that could shift odds include a sudden Hormuz Strait closure, unclaimed missile barrages, or retaliatory escalation following U.S. naval deployments, though historical patterns show Iran prefers asymmetric proxy actions over overt targeting.

Trader consensus overwhelmingly favors fewer than five ships successfully targeted by Iran by March 31 (95.5%), reflecting the absence of any verified Iranian military actions against commercial vessels in the Red Sea or Strait of Hormuz over the past 30 days. While Iran-backed Houthi militants have conducted sporadic attacks on shipping amid Gaza tensions, Tehran has limited its role to rhetorical support and proxy coordination, avoiding direct naval strikes that could provoke escalated U.S. or allied retaliation, including recent U.S.-UK airstrikes on Houthi targets. Diplomatic signals from Iranian officials emphasize restraint amid ongoing nuclear talks and sanctions pressures. Scenarios that could shift odds include a sudden Hormuz Strait closure, unclaimed missile barrages, or retaliatory escalation following U.S. naval deployments, though historical patterns show Iran prefers asymmetric proxy actions over overt targeting.

基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要 · 更新于

警惕外部链接哦。

常见问题

"How many ships will Iran successfully target by March 31?"是 Polymarket 上一个拥有 7 个可能结果的预测市场,交易者根据自己的判断买卖份额。当前领先结果为"<5",概率为 96%,其次是"5–7",概率为 3%。价格反映社区的实时概率。例如,价格为 96¢ 的份额意味着市场集体认为该结果的概率为 96%。这些赔率会随着交易者的反应而不断变化。正确结果的份额在市场结算时可兑换为每份 $1。

截至目前,"How many ships will Iran successfully target by March 31?"已产生 $50.2K 的总交易量(自Mar 17, 2026市场上线以来)。这一活跃度反映了 Polymarket 社区的高度参与,并确保当前赔率由广泛的市场参与者共同形成。你可以直接在本页追踪实时价格变动并交易任何结果。

要在"How many ships will Iran successfully target by March 31?"上交易,浏览本页上列出的 7 个可用结果。每个结果显示一个代表市场隐含概率的当前价格。要建仓,选择你认为最可能的结果,选择"是"支持或"否"反对,输入金额并点击"交易"。如果你选择的结果在市场结算时正确,你的"是"份额每份支付 $1。如果不正确,支付 $0。你也可以在结算前随时卖出份额。

"How many ships will Iran successfully target by March 31?"的当前领先者是"<5",概率为 96%,意味着市场对该结果的概率评估为 96%。紧随其后的结果是"5–7",概率为 3%。这些赔率随着交易者买卖份额而实时更新。请经常回来查看或将本页加入书签。

"How many ships will Iran successfully target by March 31?"的结算规则明确定义了每个结果被宣布为获胜者所需满足的条件——包括用于确定结果的官方数据来源。你可以在本页评论上方的"规则"部分查看完整的结算标准。我们建议在交易前仔细阅读规则,因为它们规定了精确的条件、特殊情况和数据来源。