Trader consensus reflects a 93.5% implied probability against Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven primarily by the absence of any verified threats, official statements, or intelligence reports linking Tehran to such actions. Amid heightened Israel-Iran tensions following recent missile exchanges, Iranian officials have emphasized potential retaliation via Strait of Hormuz disruptions or proxy militias like the Houthis, but not cable infrastructure. Baltic Sea cable damages earlier this month sparked sabotage fears, yet investigations point to a Chinese vessel rather than Iran. With no credible catalysts and a tight deadline, traders view the scenario as low-risk speculation lacking motive or capability evidence.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado¿Irán saboteará los cables submarinos de Internet antes del 30 de abril?
¿Irán saboteará los cables submarinos de Internet antes del 30 de abril?
Sí
$11,231 Vol.
$11,231 Vol.
Sí
$11,231 Vol.
$11,231 Vol.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus reflects a 93.5% implied probability against Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven primarily by the absence of any verified threats, official statements, or intelligence reports linking Tehran to such actions. Amid heightened Israel-Iran tensions following recent missile exchanges, Iranian officials have emphasized potential retaliation via Strait of Hormuz disruptions or proxy militias like the Houthis, but not cable infrastructure. Baltic Sea cable damages earlier this month sparked sabotage fears, yet investigations point to a Chinese vessel rather than Iran. With no credible catalysts and a tight deadline, traders view the scenario as low-risk speculation lacking motive or capability evidence.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
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