Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects low implied probability for direct Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, driven primarily by mutual deterrence after Israel's October 2024 airstrikes on Iranian military sites, which neutralized key missile capabilities without provoking a full-scale Iranian retaliation. Recent developments include Iran's restraint amid proxy escalations via Hezbollah and Houthis, U.S. diplomatic pressure post-Trump election, and IAEA reports highlighting Iran's nuclear advances but no imminent strike triggers. Ongoing Gaza ceasefire talks and potential U.S.-Iran indirect negotiations reduce escalation risks, though unexpected Israeli operations or IRGC provocations could shift odds rapidly ahead of the deadline.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要 · 更新于$2,896,363 交易量
Saudi Arabia
92%
UAE
92%
Bahrain
86%
Iraq
80%
Jordan
47%
Oman
17%
叙利亚
6%
Azerbaijan
6%
土耳其
5%
巴基斯坦
3%
塞浦路斯
2%
Armenia
2%
也门
2%
Germany
2%
英国
2%
Hungary
1%
France
1%
Ukraine
1%
Georgia
1%
Italy
1%
阿富汗
1%
印度
1%
Poland
1%
Spain
1%
$2,896,363 交易量
Saudi Arabia
92%
UAE
92%
Bahrain
86%
Iraq
80%
Jordan
47%
Oman
17%
叙利亚
6%
Azerbaijan
6%
土耳其
5%
巴基斯坦
3%
塞浦路斯
2%
Armenia
2%
也门
2%
Germany
2%
英国
2%
Hungary
1%
France
1%
Ukraine
1%
Georgia
1%
Italy
1%
阿富汗
1%
印度
1%
Poland
1%
Spain
1%
For the purposes of this market, a qualifying "strike" is defined as the use of aerial bombs, drones or missiles (including cruise or ballistic missiles) launched by Iranian military forces that impact a listed country's ground territory or any official embassy or consulate of that country (e.g., if a weapons depot on a listed country soil is hit by an Iranian missile, this market will resolve to "Yes").
Missiles or drones which are intercepted and surface-to-air missile strikes will not be sufficient for a "Yes" resolution regardless of whether they land on a listed country's territory or cause damage.
Strikes within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, will be counted as Israel.
Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market.
Actions such as artillery fire, small arms fire, FPV or ATGM strikes directly, ground incursions, naval shelling, cyberattacks, or other operations conducted by US or Israeli ground operatives will not qualify.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
If the date/time of a strike cannot be confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting by the end of the third calendar date after this market's end date, it will resolve to "No" regardless of whether a strike was later confirmed to have taken place.
市场开放时间: Feb 28, 2026, 11:33 AM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects low implied probability for direct Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, driven primarily by mutual deterrence after Israel's October 2024 airstrikes on Iranian military sites, which neutralized key missile capabilities without provoking a full-scale Iranian retaliation. Recent developments include Iran's restraint amid proxy escalations via Hezbollah and Houthis, U.S. diplomatic pressure post-Trump election, and IAEA reports highlighting Iran's nuclear advances but no imminent strike triggers. Ongoing Gaza ceasefire talks and potential U.S.-Iran indirect negotiations reduce escalation risks, though unexpected Israeli operations or IRGC provocations could shift odds rapidly ahead of the deadline.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要 · 更新于
警惕外部链接哦。
警惕外部链接哦。
常见问题