The March 31, 2026, deadline for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has passed without any military action across the Taiwan Strait, solidifying trader consensus at 100% "No" probability. This reflects the U.S. intelligence community's March 18 Annual Threat Assessment, which concluded Beijing lacks a fixed timeline or current plans for invasion—even into 2027—preferring non-military coercion like gray-zone tactics amid ongoing PLA exercises. High confidence stems from massive logistical barriers to amphibious assault, U.S. deterrence through arms sales and alliances, and China's economic interdependence vulnerabilities. Realistic shifts would require late-emerging evidence of covert action before the deadline, though none has surfaced.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要 · 更新於是
$10,607,442 交易量
$10,607,442 交易量
2026-03-31
是
$10,607,442 交易量
$10,607,442 交易量
2026-03-31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by March 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.The March 31, 2026, deadline for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has passed without any military action across the Taiwan Strait, solidifying trader consensus at 100% "No" probability. This reflects the U.S. intelligence community's March 18 Annual Threat Assessment, which concluded Beijing lacks a fixed timeline or current plans for invasion—even into 2027—preferring non-military coercion like gray-zone tactics amid ongoing PLA exercises. High confidence stems from massive logistical barriers to amphibious assault, U.S. deterrence through arms sales and alliances, and China's economic interdependence vulnerabilities. Realistic shifts would require late-emerging evidence of covert action before the deadline, though none has surfaced.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by March 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
市場開放時間： Nov 24, 2025, 12:47 PM ET
交易量
$10,607,442結束日期
2026-03-31市場開放時間
Nov 24, 2025, 12:47 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...已提議結果: 否
無爭議
最終結果: 否
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by March 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.The March 31, 2026, deadline for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has passed without any military action across the Taiwan Strait, solidifying trader consensus at 100% "No" probability. This reflects the U.S. intelligence community's March 18 Annual Threat Assessment, which concluded Beijing lacks a fixed timeline or current plans for invasion—even into 2027—preferring non-military coercion like gray-zone tactics amid ongoing PLA exercises. High confidence stems from massive logistical barriers to amphibious assault, U.S. deterrence through arms sales and alliances, and China's economic interdependence vulnerabilities. Realistic shifts would require late-emerging evidence of covert action before the deadline, though none has surfaced.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by March 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
交易量
$10,607,442結束日期
2026-03-31市場開放時間
Nov 24, 2025, 12:47 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...已提議結果: 否
無爭議
最終結果: 否
The March 31, 2026, deadline for a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan has passed without any military action across the Taiwan Strait, solidifying trader consensus at 100% "No" probability. This reflects the U.S. intelligence community's March 18 Annual Threat Assessment, which concluded Beijing lacks a fixed timeline or current plans for invasion—even into 2027—preferring non-military coercion like gray-zone tactics amid ongoing PLA exercises. High confidence stems from massive logistical barriers to amphibious assault, U.S. deterrence through arms sales and alliances, and China's economic interdependence vulnerabilities. Realistic shifts would require late-emerging evidence of covert action before the deadline, though none has surfaced.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要 · 更新於
警惕外部連結哦。
警惕外部連結哦。
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