Trader consensus on Israeli strikes in April remains tightly contested between exactly three countries (43.5%) and four or more (42.5%), driven by the multi-front US-Israel-Iran war that intensified in late February 2026 with direct attacks on Iranian targets and ground incursions into southern Lebanon against Hezbollah. IDF Chief of Staff statements this month outlined operational plans extending through early April Passover, encompassing airstrikes on Syrian and Iraqi militia positions amid persistent proxy threats. Uncertainty over Houthi escalation from Yemen—amid warnings from Gulf states—and potential diplomatic de-escalation or regime pressures in Tehran sustain the close race, with Houthi retaliation or new proxy barrages likely tipping toward ≥4, while ceasefires could cap at two or fewer.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · ActualizadoHow many different countries will Israel strike in April?
How many different countries will Israel strike in April?
≥4 40%
2 25%
≤1 7%
3 0
≤1
7%
2
25%
3
43%
≥4
43%
≥4 40%
2 25%
≤1 7%
3 0
≤1
7%
2
25%
3
43%
≥4
43%
Strikes on embassies or consulates will count towards the country where the embassy or consulate is located, not towards the country they represent.
Strikes within the territory controlled by Israel as of market creation, as well as strikes within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, will not be counted towards this market's resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a qualifying "strike" is defined as the use of aerial bombs, drones, or missiles (including cruise or ballistic missiles) launched by Israeli military forces that impact another country's ground territory that is officially acknowledged by the Israeli government or a consensus of credible reporting.
Missiles or drones that are intercepted and surface-to-air missile strikes will not count towards the resolution of this market, regardless of whether they land on another country's territory or cause damage.
Actions such as artillery fire, small arms fire, FPV or ATGM strikes directly, ground incursions, naval shelling, cyberattacks, or other operations conducted by Israeli ground operatives will not qualify.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Mar 27, 2026, 6:46 PM ET
Resolver
0x69c47De9D...Strikes on embassies or consulates will count towards the country where the embassy or consulate is located, not towards the country they represent.
Strikes within the territory controlled by Israel as of market creation, as well as strikes within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, will not be counted towards this market's resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a qualifying "strike" is defined as the use of aerial bombs, drones, or missiles (including cruise or ballistic missiles) launched by Israeli military forces that impact another country's ground territory that is officially acknowledged by the Israeli government or a consensus of credible reporting.
Missiles or drones that are intercepted and surface-to-air missile strikes will not count towards the resolution of this market, regardless of whether they land on another country's territory or cause damage.
Actions such as artillery fire, small arms fire, FPV or ATGM strikes directly, ground incursions, naval shelling, cyberattacks, or other operations conducted by Israeli ground operatives will not qualify.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x69c47De9D...Trader consensus on Israeli strikes in April remains tightly contested between exactly three countries (43.5%) and four or more (42.5%), driven by the multi-front US-Israel-Iran war that intensified in late February 2026 with direct attacks on Iranian targets and ground incursions into southern Lebanon against Hezbollah. IDF Chief of Staff statements this month outlined operational plans extending through early April Passover, encompassing airstrikes on Syrian and Iraqi militia positions amid persistent proxy threats. Uncertainty over Houthi escalation from Yemen—amid warnings from Gulf states—and potential diplomatic de-escalation or regime pressures in Tehran sustain the close race, with Houthi retaliation or new proxy barrages likely tipping toward ≥4, while ceasefires could cap at two or fewer.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
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