Traders assign a 96.5 percent probability that Iran will not acquire a nuclear weapon before 2027, reflecting the substantial damage inflicted on enrichment facilities and weapons-related sites during 2025–2026 U.S. and Israeli strikes, which eliminated most centrifuges and rendered major plants inoperable. IAEA reports confirm restricted inspector access and an existing stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, yet U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that full weaponization would require additional months for further enrichment to weapons-grade levels, assembly, and testing—steps not completed despite ongoing reconstruction and vehicle activity at select locations. Diplomatic pressure, including demands for verifiable capacity reductions, further constrains near-term breakout. Realistic shifts could arise from an Iranian leadership decision to accelerate covert efforts at undamaged tunnel sites or from undetected recovery of enriched material, though both face significant technical and verification hurdles in the limited timeframe.