This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Russia's recent missile tests at the Kura range from May 6-10, 2026, coinciding with Victory Day celebrations, involved nuclear-capable systems like the Sarmat ICBM but featured no verified nuclear detonations, tempering trader expectations for an imminent full-scale test. Following New START's expiration on February 5, 2026, without extension despite Russia's conditional one-year proposal, President Putin in November 2025 directed officials to prepare resumption plans only if other nuclear states test first, aligning with Foreign Minister Lavrov's stance against unilateral action. Amid Ukraine conflict escalation signals and arsenal modernization, trader consensus reflects low implied probabilities due to historical non-testing since 1990, CTBT suspension, and absence of concrete announcements, though U.S. policy shifts or further provocations could alter dynamics ahead of year-end deadlines.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Russia's recent missile tests at the Kura range from May 6-10, 2026, coinciding with Victory Day celebrations, involved nuclear-capable systems like the Sarmat ICBM but featured no verified nuclear detonations, tempering trader expectations for an imminent full-scale test. Following New START's expiration on February 5, 2026, without extension despite Russia's conditional one-year proposal, President Putin in November 2025 directed officials to prepare resumption plans only if other nuclear states test first, aligning with Foreign Minister Lavrov's stance against unilateral action. Amid Ukraine conflict escalation signals and arsenal modernization, trader consensus reflects low implied probabilities due to historical non-testing since 1990, CTBT suspension, and absence of concrete announcements, though U.S. policy shifts or further provocations could alter dynamics ahead of year-end deadlines.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
May 6 2026
Kyiv Post reports Russia is preparing a “doomsday” Sarmat ICBM test around Victory Day, yet satellite‑track data show the launch was scrubbed, reinforcing market belief that no
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%4%
Kyiv Post reports Russia is preparing a “doomsday” Sarmat ICBM test around Victory Day, yet satellite‑track data show the launch was scrubbed, reinforcing market belief that no nuclear blast will occur
May 6 2026
Russian Defence Ministry announces a scheduled ICBM‑capable missile test at the Kura range (May 6‑10), explicitly stating it is not a nuclear test, further dampening expectations
September 30, 2026 dips to 4%1%
Russian Defence Ministry announces a scheduled ICBM‑capable missile test at the Kura range (May 6‑10), explicitly stating it is not a nuclear test, further dampening expectations
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia (or the U.S.) resumes nuclear testing, other nations will follow, heightening concerns about a test‑free period
September 30, 2026 dips to 5%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia (or the U.S.) resumes nuclear testing, other nations will follow, heightening concerns about a test‑free period
Apr 30 2026
Russian Ministry of Defense announces missile‑test window at the Kura range in Kamchatka from May 6‑10, but explicitly states the tests are “conventional” and no nuclear devices
December 31, 2026 dips to 12%1%
Russian Ministry of Defense announces missile‑test window at the Kura range in Kamchatka from May 6‑10, but explicitly states the tests are “conventional” and no nuclear devices will be used
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 22 2026
Congressional Research Service report cites the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment confirming Russia’s “multiple failed tests” of new systems, reinforcing market doubts
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Congressional Research Service report cites the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment confirming Russia’s “multiple failed tests” of new systems, reinforcing market doubts
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Mar 28 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, noting repeated launch failures and no confirmed
December 31, 2026 drops to 38%12%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, noting repeated launch failures and no confirmed detonation
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Russia's recent missile tests at the Kura range from May 6-10, 2026, coinciding with Victory Day celebrations, involved nuclear-capable systems like the Sarmat ICBM but featured no verified nuclear detonations, tempering trader expectations for an imminent full-scale test. Following New START's expiration on February 5, 2026, without extension despite Russia's conditional one-year proposal, President Putin in November 2025 directed officials to prepare resumption plans only if other nuclear states test first, aligning with Foreign Minister Lavrov's stance against unilateral action. Amid Ukraine conflict escalation signals and arsenal modernization, trader consensus reflects low implied probabilities due to historical non-testing since 1990, CTBT suspension, and absence of concrete announcements, though U.S. policy shifts or further provocations could alter dynamics ahead of year-end deadlines.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Russia's recent missile tests at the Kura range from May 6-10, 2026, coinciding with Victory Day celebrations, involved nuclear-capable systems like the Sarmat ICBM but featured no verified nuclear detonations, tempering trader expectations for an imminent full-scale test. Following New START's expiration on February 5, 2026, without extension despite Russia's conditional one-year proposal, President Putin in November 2025 directed officials to prepare resumption plans only if other nuclear states test first, aligning with Foreign Minister Lavrov's stance against unilateral action. Amid Ukraine conflict escalation signals and arsenal modernization, trader consensus reflects low implied probabilities due to historical non-testing since 1990, CTBT suspension, and absence of concrete announcements, though U.S. policy shifts or further provocations could alter dynamics ahead of year-end deadlines.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
May 6 2026
Kyiv Post reports Russia is preparing a “doomsday” Sarmat ICBM test around Victory Day, yet satellite‑track data show the launch was scrubbed, reinforcing market belief that no
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%4%
Kyiv Post reports Russia is preparing a “doomsday” Sarmat ICBM test around Victory Day, yet satellite‑track data show the launch was scrubbed, reinforcing market belief that no nuclear blast will occur
May 6 2026
Russian Defence Ministry announces a scheduled ICBM‑capable missile test at the Kura range (May 6‑10), explicitly stating it is not a nuclear test, further dampening expectations
September 30, 2026 dips to 4%1%
Russian Defence Ministry announces a scheduled ICBM‑capable missile test at the Kura range (May 6‑10), explicitly stating it is not a nuclear test, further dampening expectations
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia (or the U.S.) resumes nuclear testing, other nations will follow, heightening concerns about a test‑free period
September 30, 2026 dips to 5%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia (or the U.S.) resumes nuclear testing, other nations will follow, heightening concerns about a test‑free period
Apr 30 2026
Russian Ministry of Defense announces missile‑test window at the Kura range in Kamchatka from May 6‑10, but explicitly states the tests are “conventional” and no nuclear devices
December 31, 2026 dips to 12%1%
Russian Ministry of Defense announces missile‑test window at the Kura range in Kamchatka from May 6‑10, but explicitly states the tests are “conventional” and no nuclear devices will be used
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 22 2026
Congressional Research Service report cites the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment confirming Russia’s “multiple failed tests” of new systems, reinforcing market doubts
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Congressional Research Service report cites the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment confirming Russia’s “multiple failed tests” of new systems, reinforcing market doubts
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Mar 28 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, noting repeated launch failures and no confirmed
December 31, 2026 drops to 38%12%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, noting repeated launch failures and no confirmed detonation
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Часто задаваемые вопросы
«Ядерное испытание России...?» — это рынок прогнозов на Polymarket с 6 возможными исходами, где трейдеры покупают и продают акции на основе своих прогнозов. Текущий лидирующий исход — «31 декабря 2026 года» с 8%, за ним следует «30 сентября 2026 года» с 5%. Цены отражают вероятности сообщества в реальном времени. Например, акция по цене 8¢ означает, что рынок коллективно оценивает вероятность этого исхода в 8%. Эти коэффициенты постоянно меняются. Акции правильного исхода можно обменять на $1 каждую при разрешении рынка.
На сегодняшний день «Ядерное испытание России...?» сгенерировал общий объём торгов $1.4 million с момента запуска рынка Nov 5, 2025. Такой уровень активности отражает высокую вовлечённость сообщества Polymarket и гарантирует, что текущие коэффициенты формируются широким кругом участников рынка. Ты можешь отслеживать движение цен в реальном времени и торговать любым исходом прямо на этой странице.
Чтобы торговать на «Ядерное испытание России...?», просмотри 6 доступных исходов на этой странице. Каждый исход показывает текущую цену, представляющую подразумеваемую вероятность рынка. Чтобы занять позицию, выбери исход, который считаешь наиболее вероятным, выбери «Да» для торговли в его пользу или «Нет» для торговли против, введи сумму и нажми «Торговать». Если твой выбранный исход окажется верным, твои акции «Да» принесут $1 каждая. Если нет — $0. Ты также можешь продать акции до разрешения.
Это очень открытый рынок. Текущий лидер для «Ядерное испытание России...?» — «31 декабря 2026 года» всего с 8%, а «30 сентября 2026 года» близко позади с 5%. Поскольку ни один исход не доминирует, трейдеры видят это как крайне неопределённую ситуацию, что может создавать уникальные торговые возможности. Эти коэффициенты обновляются в реальном времени, так что добавь эту страницу в закладки.
Правила разрешения «Ядерное испытание России...?» точно определяют, что должно произойти, чтобы каждый исход был объявлен победителем, включая официальные источники данных, используемые для определения результата. Ты можешь просмотреть полные критерии разрешения в разделе «Правила» на этой странице над комментариями. Мы рекомендуем внимательно прочитать правила перед торговлей, так как они определяют точные условия, особые случаи и источники.
Да. Тебе не нужно торговать, чтобы оставаться в курсе. Эта страница служит трекером в реальном времени для «Ядерное испытание России...?». Вероятности исходов обновляются в реальном времени по мере поступления новых сделок. Ты можешь добавить эту страницу в закладки и читать раздел комментариев, чтобы узнать мнение других трейдеров. Ты также можешь использовать фильтры временного диапазона на графике, чтобы увидеть, как менялись коэффициенты со временем.
Коэффициенты Polymarket устанавливаются реальными трейдерами, вкладывающими реальные деньги в свои убеждения, что обычно приводит к точным прогнозам. С объёмом торгов $1.4 million по “Ядерное испытание России...?” эти цены агрегируют коллективные знания и убеждённость тысяч участников — часто превосходя опросы, экспертные прогнозы и традиционные исследования. Рынки прогнозов, такие как Polymarket, имеют сильный послужной список точности, особенно когда события приближаются к дате разрешения. Например, месячный показатель точности Polymarket составляет 94%. Для получения последних статистических данных о точности прогнозов Polymarket посети страницу точности на Polymarket.
Чтобы совершить первую сделку на «Ядерное испытание России...?», зарегистрируй бесплатный аккаунт на Polymarket и пополни его с помощью криптовалюты, кредитной или дебетовой карты или банковского перевода. После пополнения аккаунта вернись на эту страницу, выбери исход, на который хочешь торговать, введи сумму и нажми «Торговать». Если ты новичок на рынках прогнозов, нажми на ссылку «Как это работает» вверху любой страницы Polymarket для пошагового руководства.
На Polymarket цена каждого исхода представляет подразумеваемую вероятность рынка. Цена 8¢ для «31 декабря 2026 года» на рынке «Ядерное испытание России...?» означает, что трейдеры коллективно оценивают вероятность того, что «31 декабря 2026 года» будет правильным результатом, примерно в 8%. Если ты купишь акции «Да» по 8¢ и исход окажется правильным, ты получишь $1,00 за акцию — прибыль 92¢ за акцию. Если нет — эти акции будут стоить $0.
Запланированная дата окончания рынка «Ядерное испытание России...?» прошла, но рынок ещё не был официально разрешён. Дата окончания указывает, когда ожидается наступление базового события. Рынок остаётся открытым для торговли до формального разрешения. Проверь статус разрешения и раздел «Правила» на этой странице для обновлений.
Рынок «Ядерное испытание России...?» имеет растущая дискуссия из 7 комментариев, где трейдеры делятся своим анализом, обсуждают исходы и последние события. Прокрути вниз до раздела комментариев, чтобы прочитать, что думают другие участники. Ты также можешь фильтровать по «Топ-держателям» или проверить вкладку «Активность» для ленты сделок в реальном времени.
Polymarket — крупнейший в мире рынок прогнозов, где ты можешь оставаться в курсе событий и зарабатывать на своих знаниях о реальных событиях. Трейдеры покупают и продают акции на исходы по темам от политики и выборов до криптовалют, финансов, спорта, технологий и культуры, включая рынки вроде «Ядерное испытание России...?». Цены отражают вероятности в реальном времени, подкреплённые финансовыми убеждениями, зачастую обеспечивая более быстрые и точные сигналы, чем опросы, эксперты или традиционные исследования.
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