Trader consensus prices a 92.5% chance against any European country formalizing a NATO Article 5-style bilateral security guarantee for Ukraine by June 30, reflecting the absence of binding military intervention pledges despite recent cooperation pacts. Bulgaria signed a 10-year defense and energy agreement on March 31, emphasizing joint production and aid, while Spain inked a similar bilateral deal on March 18 focused on military support. The EU Council's March 19 statement affirmed readiness for collective guarantees via the Coalition of the Willing, but Hungary and Slovakia's blocks on €90 billion aid underscore divisions. With focus shifting to a proposed €45 billion 2026 loan announced April 1, fiscal pressures and prior pacts with nations like Poland and the UK leave scant room for new robust commitments before the deadline.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket · Mis à jourOui
$102,315 Vol.
$102,315 Vol.
30 juin 2026
Oui
$102,315 Vol.
$102,315 Vol.
30 juin 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if any European country formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the relevant European country and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the relevant European country to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.Trader consensus prices a 92.5% chance against any European country formalizing a NATO Article 5-style bilateral security guarantee for Ukraine by June 30, reflecting the absence of binding military intervention pledges despite recent cooperation pacts. Bulgaria signed a 10-year defense and energy agreement on March 31, emphasizing joint production and aid, while Spain inked a similar bilateral deal on March 18 focused on military support. The EU Council's March 19 statement affirmed readiness for collective guarantees via the Coalition of the Willing, but Hungary and Slovakia's blocks on €90 billion aid underscore divisions. With focus shifting to a proposed €45 billion 2026 loan announced April 1, fiscal pressures and prior pacts with nations like Poland and the UK leave scant room for new robust commitments before the deadline.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if any European country formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the relevant European country and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the relevant European country to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.
Marché ouvert : Dec 28, 2025, 6:06 PM ET
Volume
$102,315Date de fin
30 juin 2026Marché ouvert
Dec 28, 2025, 6:06 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if any European country formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the relevant European country and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the relevant European country to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.Trader consensus prices a 92.5% chance against any European country formalizing a NATO Article 5-style bilateral security guarantee for Ukraine by June 30, reflecting the absence of binding military intervention pledges despite recent cooperation pacts. Bulgaria signed a 10-year defense and energy agreement on March 31, emphasizing joint production and aid, while Spain inked a similar bilateral deal on March 18 focused on military support. The EU Council's March 19 statement affirmed readiness for collective guarantees via the Coalition of the Willing, but Hungary and Slovakia's blocks on €90 billion aid underscore divisions. With focus shifting to a proposed €45 billion 2026 loan announced April 1, fiscal pressures and prior pacts with nations like Poland and the UK leave scant room for new robust commitments before the deadline.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if any European country formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the relevant European country and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the relevant European country to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the relevant European country must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Qualifying European countries include: Albania; Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Belgium; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; United Kingdom.
Volume
$102,315Date de fin
30 juin 2026Marché ouvert
Dec 28, 2025, 6:06 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices a 92.5% chance against any European country formalizing a NATO Article 5-style bilateral security guarantee for Ukraine by June 30, reflecting the absence of binding military intervention pledges despite recent cooperation pacts. Bulgaria signed a 10-year defense and energy agreement on March 31, emphasizing joint production and aid, while Spain inked a similar bilateral deal on March 18 focused on military support. The EU Council's March 19 statement affirmed readiness for collective guarantees via the Coalition of the Willing, but Hungary and Slovakia's blocks on €90 billion aid underscore divisions. With focus shifting to a proposed €45 billion 2026 loan announced April 1, fiscal pressures and prior pacts with nations like Poland and the UK leave scant room for new robust commitments before the deadline.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket · Mis à jour
Méfiez-vous des liens externes.
Méfiez-vous des liens externes.
Questions fréquentes