The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence's March 18, 2026, Annual Threat Assessment—concluding China likely will not invade Taiwan in 2027 and prefers unification without force—anchors trader consensus at an 87.5% implied probability against invasion by June 30. This reflects recent de-escalation signals, including fewer People's Liberation Army flights around the Taiwan Strait and no major exercises since late 2025, amid Beijing's economic headwinds, internal PLA readiness purges, and robust U.S. deterrence. China sustains multidomain coercive pressure through gray-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait, but amphibious barriers remain high. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts, escalation signals, or U.S. policy changes could still alter odds.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · ActualizadoWill China invade Taiwan by June 30, 2027?
Will China invade Taiwan by June 30, 2027?
NUEVO
$10,577 Vol.
NUEVO
$10,577 Vol.
30 jun 2027
NUEVO
$10,577 Vol.
NUEVO
$10,577 Vol.
30 jun 2027
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by June 30, 2027, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence's March 18, 2026, Annual Threat Assessment—concluding China likely will not invade Taiwan in 2027 and prefers unification without force—anchors trader consensus at an 87.5% implied probability against invasion by June 30. This reflects recent de-escalation signals, including fewer People's Liberation Army flights around the Taiwan Strait and no major exercises since late 2025, amid Beijing's economic headwinds, internal PLA readiness purges, and robust U.S. deterrence. China sustains multidomain coercive pressure through gray-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait, but amphibious barriers remain high. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts, escalation signals, or U.S. policy changes could still alter odds.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by June 30, 2027, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Mercado abierto: Apr 1, 2026, 12:17 PM ET
Volumen
$10,577Fecha de finalización
30 jun 2027Mercado abierto
Apr 1, 2026, 12:17 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by June 30, 2027, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence's March 18, 2026, Annual Threat Assessment—concluding China likely will not invade Taiwan in 2027 and prefers unification without force—anchors trader consensus at an 87.5% implied probability against invasion by June 30. This reflects recent de-escalation signals, including fewer People's Liberation Army flights around the Taiwan Strait and no major exercises since late 2025, amid Beijing's economic headwinds, internal PLA readiness purges, and robust U.S. deterrence. China sustains multidomain coercive pressure through gray-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait, but amphibious barriers remain high. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts, escalation signals, or U.S. policy changes could still alter odds.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if China commences a military offensive intended to establish control over any portion of the Republic of China (Taiwan) by June 30, 2027, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Volumen
$10,577Fecha de finalización
30 jun 2027Mercado abierto
Apr 1, 2026, 12:17 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence's March 18, 2026, Annual Threat Assessment—concluding China likely will not invade Taiwan in 2027 and prefers unification without force—anchors trader consensus at an 87.5% implied probability against invasion by June 30. This reflects recent de-escalation signals, including fewer People's Liberation Army flights around the Taiwan Strait and no major exercises since late 2025, amid Beijing's economic headwinds, internal PLA readiness purges, and robust U.S. deterrence. China sustains multidomain coercive pressure through gray-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait, but amphibious barriers remain high. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts, escalation signals, or U.S. policy changes could still alter odds.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado
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