This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Russia has maintained a de facto moratorium on nuclear explosive tests since 1990, despite revoking ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2023 and New START's expiration in February 2026, fostering trader consensus on low implied probabilities amid absent concrete detonation announcements. The most recent development—nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile tests at Kura range from May 6-10, timed for Victory Day—signals posturing in the Ukraine conflict but stops short of explosion verification, as confirmed by monitoring agencies. Significant barriers include escalation risks, international diplomatic pressure, and site readiness at Novaya Zemlya; abrupt U.S. testing or heightened tensions could prompt shifts before year-end deadlines.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Russia has maintained a de facto moratorium on nuclear explosive tests since 1990, despite revoking ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2023 and New START's expiration in February 2026, fostering trader consensus on low implied probabilities amid absent concrete detonation announcements. The most recent development—nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile tests at Kura range from May 6-10, timed for Victory Day—signals posturing in the Ukraine conflict but stops short of explosion verification, as confirmed by monitoring agencies. Significant barriers include escalation risks, international diplomatic pressure, and site readiness at Novaya Zemlya; abrupt U.S. testing or heightened tensions could prompt shifts before year-end deadlines.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
May 7 2026
Polymarket summary notes continued “no‑test” trend despite ongoing Russian saber‑rattling
An update on the market highlighted that, despite heightened rhetoric, there had been no verified nuclear detonation in the preceding 30 days, keeping the probability low.
May 6 2026
Russian defence ministry announces scheduled ICBM missile tests at the Kura range (May 6‑10)
September 30, 2026 rises to 6%2%
While the announced tests involved conventional‑capable ICBMs—not nuclear detonations—the warning sparked a brief rally in the market, lifting the “Yes”
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
U.S. “Report to Congress on Russia’s Nuclear Weapons” reiterates that Russia is modernizing its arsenal but notes “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing the view that
December 31, 2026 drops to 5%8%
U.S. “Report to Congress on Russia’s Nuclear Weapons” reiterates that Russia is modernizing its arsenal but notes “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing the view that a test is unlikely and pushing the market down to the low‑single‑digit range
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warns that if the United States or Russia resume nuclear testing, other nations will follow, raising concerns that Russia might break its
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warns that if the United States or Russia resume nuclear testing, other nations will follow, raising concerns that Russia might break its moratorium and causing a modest
Apr 30 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates “multiple failed tests” and notes Russia’s modernisation challenges
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%4%
The CRS brief to Congress echoed the ATA’s assessment that Russia was modernising its nuclear forces amid repeated test failures, further dampening expectations of a September test.
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 21 2026
IAEA chief warns that any Russian nuclear test could trigger a cascade of tests worldwide
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%4%
Rafael Grossi cautioned that if Russia resumed testing, other nations would follow, reinforcing market sentiment that a Russian test was unlikely in the near term.
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 14 2026
Russia announces missile tests at the Kura range, including launches of nuclear‑capable Bulava and Yars systems, briefly reviving speculation of an imminent test and nudging the
December 31, 2026 rises to 13%1%
Russia announces missile tests at the Kura range, including launches of nuclear‑capable Bulava and Yars systems, briefly reviving speculation of an imminent test and nudging the
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Apr 1 2026
Polymarket data shows the market peak at 51 % after earlier optimism, but the same day analysts note the intelligence report of failed tests, triggering the largest one‑day drop
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%39%
Polymarket data shows the market peak at 51 % after earlier optimism, but the same day analysts note the intelligence report of failed tests, triggering the largest one‑day drop the next day
Mar 30 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood
December 31, 2026 drops to 38%12%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts to modernize its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline.
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Russia has maintained a de facto moratorium on nuclear explosive tests since 1990, despite revoking ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2023 and New START's expiration in February 2026, fostering trader consensus on low implied probabilities amid absent concrete detonation announcements. The most recent development—nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile tests at Kura range from May 6-10, timed for Victory Day—signals posturing in the Ukraine conflict but stops short of explosion verification, as confirmed by monitoring agencies. Significant barriers include escalation risks, international diplomatic pressure, and site readiness at Novaya Zemlya; abrupt U.S. testing or heightened tensions could prompt shifts before year-end deadlines.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Russia has maintained a de facto moratorium on nuclear explosive tests since 1990, despite revoking ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2023 and New START's expiration in February 2026, fostering trader consensus on low implied probabilities amid absent concrete detonation announcements. The most recent development—nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile tests at Kura range from May 6-10, timed for Victory Day—signals posturing in the Ukraine conflict but stops short of explosion verification, as confirmed by monitoring agencies. Significant barriers include escalation risks, international diplomatic pressure, and site readiness at Novaya Zemlya; abrupt U.S. testing or heightened tensions could prompt shifts before year-end deadlines.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
May 7 2026
Polymarket summary notes continued “no‑test” trend despite ongoing Russian saber‑rattling
An update on the market highlighted that, despite heightened rhetoric, there had been no verified nuclear detonation in the preceding 30 days, keeping the probability low.
May 6 2026
Russian defence ministry announces scheduled ICBM missile tests at the Kura range (May 6‑10)
September 30, 2026 rises to 6%2%
While the announced tests involved conventional‑capable ICBMs—not nuclear detonations—the warning sparked a brief rally in the market, lifting the “Yes”
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
U.S. “Report to Congress on Russia’s Nuclear Weapons” reiterates that Russia is modernizing its arsenal but notes “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing the view that
December 31, 2026 drops to 5%8%
U.S. “Report to Congress on Russia’s Nuclear Weapons” reiterates that Russia is modernizing its arsenal but notes “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing the view that a test is unlikely and pushing the market down to the low‑single‑digit range
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warns that if the United States or Russia resume nuclear testing, other nations will follow, raising concerns that Russia might break its
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi warns that if the United States or Russia resume nuclear testing, other nations will follow, raising concerns that Russia might break its moratorium and causing a modest
Apr 30 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates “multiple failed tests” and notes Russia’s modernisation challenges
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%4%
The CRS brief to Congress echoed the ATA’s assessment that Russia was modernising its nuclear forces amid repeated test failures, further dampening expectations of a September test.
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 21 2026
IAEA chief warns that any Russian nuclear test could trigger a cascade of tests worldwide
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%4%
Rafael Grossi cautioned that if Russia resumed testing, other nations would follow, reinforcing market sentiment that a Russian test was unlikely in the near term.
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 14 2026
Russia announces missile tests at the Kura range, including launches of nuclear‑capable Bulava and Yars systems, briefly reviving speculation of an imminent test and nudging the
December 31, 2026 rises to 13%1%
Russia announces missile tests at the Kura range, including launches of nuclear‑capable Bulava and Yars systems, briefly reviving speculation of an imminent test and nudging the
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Apr 1 2026
Polymarket data shows the market peak at 51 % after earlier optimism, but the same day analysts note the intelligence report of failed tests, triggering the largest one‑day drop
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%39%
Polymarket data shows the market peak at 51 % after earlier optimism, but the same day analysts note the intelligence report of failed tests, triggering the largest one‑day drop the next day
Mar 30 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood
December 31, 2026 drops to 38%12%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts to modernize its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline.
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
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Questions fréquentes
« Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? » est un marché de prédiction sur Polymarket avec 6 résultats possibles où les traders achètent et vendent des parts selon ce qu'ils pensent qu'il se passera. Le résultat en tête actuel est « 31 décembre 2026 » à 8%, suivi de « 30 septembre 2026 » à 5%. Les prix reflètent des probabilités en temps réel de la communauté. Par exemple, une part cotée à 8¢ implique que le marché attribue collectivement une probabilité de 8% à ce résultat. Ces cotes changent en permanence. Les parts du résultat correct sont échangeables contre $1 chacune lors de la résolution du marché.
À ce jour, « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? » a généré $1.4 million en volume total de trading depuis le lancement du marché le Nov 5, 2025. Ce niveau d'activité reflète un fort engagement de la communauté Polymarket et garantit que les cotes actuelles sont alimentées par un large bassin de participants. Vous pouvez suivre les mouvements de prix en direct et trader sur n'importe quel résultat directement sur cette page.
Pour trader sur « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? », parcourez les 6 résultats disponibles sur cette page. Chaque résultat affiche un prix actuel représentant la probabilité implicite du marché. Pour prendre position, sélectionnez le résultat que vous estimez le plus probable, choisissez « Oui » pour trader en sa faveur ou « Non » pour trader contre, entrez votre montant et cliquez sur « Trader ». Si votre résultat choisi est correct lors de la résolution, vos parts « Oui » rapportent $1 chacune. S'il est incorrect, elles rapportent $0. Vous pouvez également vendre vos parts avant la résolution.
C'est un marché très ouvert. Le leader actuel pour « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? » est « 31 décembre 2026 » à seulement 8%, avec « 30 septembre 2026 » juste derrière à 5%. Aucun résultat ne dominant clairement, les traders voient cela comme très incertain, ce qui peut présenter des opportunités de trading uniques. Ces cotes sont mises à jour en temps réel, alors ajoutez cette page à vos favoris.
Les règles de résolution de « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? » définissent exactement ce qui doit se produire pour que chaque résultat soit déclaré gagnant, y compris les sources de données officielles utilisées pour déterminer le résultat. Vous pouvez consulter les critères de résolution complets dans la section « Règles » sur cette page au-dessus des commentaires. Nous recommandons de lire attentivement les règles avant de trader, car elles précisent les conditions exactes, les cas particuliers et les sources.
Oui. Vous n'avez pas besoin de trader pour rester informé. Cette page sert de suivi en direct pour « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? ». Les probabilités des résultats sont mises à jour en temps réel à mesure que de nouvelles transactions arrivent. Vous pouvez ajouter cette page à vos favoris et consulter la section commentaires pour voir ce que disent les autres traders. Vous pouvez également utiliser les filtres de plage temporelle sur le graphique pour voir comment les cotes ont évolué au fil du temps.
Les cotes de Polymarket sont fixées par de vrais traders qui mettent de l'argent réel derrière leurs convictions, ce qui tend à produire des prédictions précises. Avec $1.4 million échangés sur « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? », ces prix agrègent les connaissances collectives et la conviction de milliers de participants — surpassant souvent les sondages, les prévisions d’experts et les enquêtes traditionnelles. Les marchés de prédiction comme Polymarket ont un solide historique de précision, surtout à mesure que les événements approchent de leur date de résolution. Par exemple, Polymarket a un score de précision sur un mois de 94%. Pour les dernières statistiques sur la précision des prédictions de Polymarket, visitez la page de précision sur Polymarket.
Pour placer votre première transaction sur « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? », inscrivez-vous pour un compte Polymarket gratuit et approvisionnez-le en utilisant des cryptomonnaies, une carte de crédit ou débit, ou un virement bancaire. Une fois votre compte approvisionné, revenez sur cette page, sélectionnez le résultat sur lequel vous souhaitez trader, entrez votre montant et cliquez sur « Trader ». Si vous êtes nouveau dans les marchés de prédiction, cliquez sur le lien « Comment ça marche » en haut de n'importe quelle page Polymarket pour un guide étape par étape.
Sur Polymarket, le prix de chaque résultat représente la probabilité implicite du marché. Un prix de 8¢ pour « 31 décembre 2026 » sur le marché « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? » signifie que les traders estiment collectivement qu'il y a environ une probabilité de 8% que « 31 décembre 2026 » sera le résultat correct. Si vous achetez des parts « Oui » à 8¢ et que le résultat est correct, vous recevez $1,00 par part — un gain de 92¢ par part. S'il est incorrect, ces parts valent $0.
La date de fin prévue du marché « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? » est passée, mais le marché n'a pas encore été officiellement résolu. La date de fin indique quand l'événement sous-jacent est censé se produire ou devenir connaissable. Le marché reste ouvert au trading jusqu'à ce que le résultat soit formellement résolu. Consultez le statut de résolution et la section « Règles » sur cette page pour les mises à jour.
Le marché « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? » a une discussion croissante de 7 commentaires où les traders partagent leurs analyses, débattent des résultats et discutent des derniers développements. Faites défiler jusqu'à la section commentaires ci-dessous pour lire ce que pensent les autres participants. Vous pouvez également filtrer par « Principaux détenteurs » ou consulter l'onglet « Activité » pour un flux en temps réel des transactions.
Polymarket est le plus grand marché de prédiction au monde, où vous pouvez rester informé et profiter de vos connaissances sur les événements du monde réel. Les traders achètent et vendent des parts sur des résultats allant de la politique et des élections aux cryptomonnaies, finances, sports, technologie et culture, y compris des marchés comme « Essai nucléaire de la Russie par… ? ». Les prix reflètent des probabilités en temps réel soutenues par une conviction financière, fournissant souvent des signaux plus rapides et plus précis que les sondages, les commentateurs ou les enquêtes traditionnelles.
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Questions fréquentes