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Política·Trump-Zelenskyy

Os EUA concordam em dar garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho?

Market icon
Política·Trump-Zelenskyy

Os EUA concordam em dar garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho?

jun 30

jun 30

Sim

11% acaso
Polymarket

$133,412 Vol.

Sim

11% acaso
Polymarket

$133,412 Vol.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 89% for a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement by June 30, driven by Washington's firm linkage of guarantees to a peace deal requiring Ukraine to cede Donbas, as President Zelenskiy revealed to Reuters on March 25 amid stalled territorial talks. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated on March 27 that guarantees would activate only post-war, underscoring no pre-ceasefire commitment. While Zelenskiy reported progress April 1 after calls with Trump administration envoys on strengthening a draft outline, ongoing hostilities—including Russia's April 2 drone strikes rejecting an Easter truce—highlight persistent barriers. With under three months left and no high-level finalization signaled, traders see slim odds of resolution amid these diplomatic preconditions.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$133,412
Data de Término
30 jun 2026
Mercado Aberto
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices "No" at 89% for a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement by June 30, driven by Washington's firm linkage of guarantees to a peace deal requiring Ukraine to cede Donbas, as President Zelenskiy revealed to Reuters on March 25 amid stalled territorial talks. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated on March 27 that guarantees would activate only post-war, underscoring no pre-ceasefire commitment. While Zelenskiy reported progress April 1 after calls with Trump administration envoys on strengthening a draft outline, ongoing hostilities—including Russia's April 2 drone strikes rejecting an Easter truce—highlight persistent barriers. With under three months left and no high-level finalization signaled, traders see slim odds of resolution amid these diplomatic preconditions.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$133,412
Data de Término
31 dez 2026
Mercado Aberto
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.

Cuidado com os links externos.

Frequently Asked Questions

"Os EUA concordam em dar garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho? " is a prediction market on Polymarket with 2 possible outcomes where traders buy and sell shares based on what they believe will happen. The current leading outcome is "EUA concordam em conceder garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho?" at 11%. Prices reflect real-time crowd-sourced probabilities. For example, a share priced at 11¢ implies that the market collectively assigns a 11% chance to that outcome. These odds shift continuously as traders react to new developments and information. Shares in the correct outcome are redeemable for $1 each upon market resolution.

As of today, "Os EUA concordam em dar garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho? " has generated $133.4K in total trading volume since the market launched on Dec 28, 2025. This level of trading activity reflects strong engagement from the Polymarket community and helps ensure that the current odds are informed by a deep pool of market participants. You can track live price movements and trade on any outcome directly on this page.

To trade on "Os EUA concordam em dar garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho? ," browse the 2 available outcomes listed on this page. Each outcome displays a current price representing the market's implied probability. To take a position, select the outcome you believe is most likely, choose "Yes" to trade in favor of it or "No" to trade against it, enter your amount, and click "Trade." If your chosen outcome is correct when the market resolves, your "Yes" shares pay out $1 each. If it's incorrect, they pay out $0. You can also sell your shares at any time before resolution if you want to lock in a profit or cut a loss.

The current frontrunner for "Os EUA concordam em dar garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho? " is "EUA concordam em conceder garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho?" at 11%, meaning the market assigns a 11% chance to that outcome. These odds update in real-time as traders buy and sell shares, so they reflect the latest collective view of what's most likely to happen. Check back frequently or bookmark this page to follow how the odds shift as new information emerges.

The resolution rules for "Os EUA concordam em dar garantia de segurança à Ucrânia até 30 de junho? " define exactly what needs to happen for each outcome to be declared a winner — including the official data sources used to determine the result. You can review the complete resolution criteria in the "Rules" section on this page above the comments. We recommend reading the rules carefully before trading, as they specify the precise conditions, edge cases, and sources that govern how this market is settled.