Trader consensus assigns an 83.5% implied probability to "No" on a US-Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, driven by the Biden administration's consistent reluctance to commit to a formal bilateral pact amid stalled negotiations and domestic political hurdles. Zelenskyy has pressed for guarantees akin to those signed recently by European allies like France and Germany, but US focus remains on flexible security assistance packages, with the latest $61 billion aid approved in April yet no binding agreement in sight. The G7 summit last week emphasized a $50 billion loan from frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's recovery, bypassing military guarantees. No White House or State Department announcements signal progress, and congressional divisions over long-term commitments reinforce trader skepticism as the deadline nears without scheduled talks.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約 · 更新日米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？
米国は6月30日までにウクライナの安全保障を保証することに同意しますか？
はい
$128,287 Vol.
$128,287 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
はい
$128,287 Vol.
$128,287 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus assigns an 83.5% implied probability to "No" on a US-Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, driven by the Biden administration's consistent reluctance to commit to a formal bilateral pact amid stalled negotiations and domestic political hurdles. Zelenskyy has pressed for guarantees akin to those signed recently by European allies like France and Germany, but US focus remains on flexible security assistance packages, with the latest $61 billion aid approved in April yet no binding agreement in sight. The G7 summit last week emphasized a $50 billion loan from frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's recovery, bypassing military guarantees. No White House or State Department announcements signal progress, and congressional divisions over long-term commitments reinforce trader skepticism as the deadline nears without scheduled talks.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
マーケット開始日： Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
音量
$128,287終了日
Jun 30, 2026マーケット開始日
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus assigns an 83.5% implied probability to "No" on a US-Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, driven by the Biden administration's consistent reluctance to commit to a formal bilateral pact amid stalled negotiations and domestic political hurdles. Zelenskyy has pressed for guarantees akin to those signed recently by European allies like France and Germany, but US focus remains on flexible security assistance packages, with the latest $61 billion aid approved in April yet no binding agreement in sight. The G7 summit last week emphasized a $50 billion loan from frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's recovery, bypassing military guarantees. No White House or State Department announcements signal progress, and congressional divisions over long-term commitments reinforce trader skepticism as the deadline nears without scheduled talks.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
音量
$128,287終了日
Dec 31, 2026マーケット開始日
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus assigns an 83.5% implied probability to "No" on a US-Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, driven by the Biden administration's consistent reluctance to commit to a formal bilateral pact amid stalled negotiations and domestic political hurdles. Zelenskyy has pressed for guarantees akin to those signed recently by European allies like France and Germany, but US focus remains on flexible security assistance packages, with the latest $61 billion aid approved in April yet no binding agreement in sight. The G7 summit last week emphasized a $50 billion loan from frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's recovery, bypassing military guarantees. No White House or State Department announcements signal progress, and congressional divisions over long-term commitments reinforce trader skepticism as the deadline nears without scheduled talks.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約 · 更新日
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