The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence's March 18, 2026, Annual Threat Assessment—concluding China likely will not invade Taiwan in 2027 and prefers unification without force—anchors trader consensus at an 87.5% implied probability against invasion by June 30. This reflects recent de-escalation signals, including fewer People's Liberation Army flights around the Taiwan Strait and no major exercises since late 2025, amid Beijing's economic headwinds, internal PLA readiness purges, and robust U.S. deterrence. China sustains multidomain coercive pressure through gray-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait, but amphibious barriers remain high. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts, escalation signals, or U.S. policy changes could still alter odds.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket · Mis à jourWill China invade Taiwan by June 30, 2027?
Will China invade Taiwan by June 30, 2027?
$10,577 Vol.
$10,577 Vol.
$10,577 Vol.
$10,577 Vol.
Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Marché ouvert : Apr 1, 2026, 12:17 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Territory under the administration of the Republic of China, including any inhabited islands, will qualify; however, uninhabited islands will not qualify.
The resolution source for this market will be official confirmation by China, Taiwan, the United Nations, or any permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, a consensus of credible reporting will also be used.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence's March 18, 2026, Annual Threat Assessment—concluding China likely will not invade Taiwan in 2027 and prefers unification without force—anchors trader consensus at an 87.5% implied probability against invasion by June 30. This reflects recent de-escalation signals, including fewer People's Liberation Army flights around the Taiwan Strait and no major exercises since late 2025, amid Beijing's economic headwinds, internal PLA readiness purges, and robust U.S. deterrence. China sustains multidomain coercive pressure through gray-zone tactics in the Taiwan Strait, but amphibious barriers remain high. Late-breaking diplomatic shifts, escalation signals, or U.S. policy changes could still alter odds.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket · Mis à jour
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