Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects an 89% implied probability against the U.S. formally committing to a Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral negotiations amid stringent conditions. On March 25, President Zelenskyy revealed to Reuters that the Trump administration links such guarantees—potentially for 15 years—to Kyiv ceding all of Donbas to Russia as part of a peace deal, a demand Ukraine has rejected as undermining its defensive positions and European security. Despite Zelenskyy's January claim that a document was "100% ready," no signing has occurred, with talks prioritizing peace agreement resolution first. Ongoing U.S. aid via the FY2026 NDAA provides weapons funding but not the binding bilateral pact akin to NATO commitments, leaving slim prospects absent a diplomatic breakthrough.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要 · 更新於美國同意在6月30日前向烏克蘭提供安全保證嗎？
美國同意在6月30日前向烏克蘭提供安全保證嗎？
是
$133,412 交易量
$133,412 交易量
2026-12-31
是
$133,412 交易量
$133,412 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects an 89% implied probability against the U.S. formally committing to a Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral negotiations amid stringent conditions. On March 25, President Zelenskyy revealed to Reuters that the Trump administration links such guarantees—potentially for 15 years—to Kyiv ceding all of Donbas to Russia as part of a peace deal, a demand Ukraine has rejected as undermining its defensive positions and European security. Despite Zelenskyy's January claim that a document was "100% ready," no signing has occurred, with talks prioritizing peace agreement resolution first. Ongoing U.S. aid via the FY2026 NDAA provides weapons funding but not the binding bilateral pact akin to NATO commitments, leaving slim prospects absent a diplomatic breakthrough.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市場開放時間： Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
交易量
$133,412結束日期
2026-06-30市場開放時間
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects an 89% implied probability against the U.S. formally committing to a Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral negotiations amid stringent conditions. On March 25, President Zelenskyy revealed to Reuters that the Trump administration links such guarantees—potentially for 15 years—to Kyiv ceding all of Donbas to Russia as part of a peace deal, a demand Ukraine has rejected as undermining its defensive positions and European security. Despite Zelenskyy's January claim that a document was "100% ready," no signing has occurred, with talks prioritizing peace agreement resolution first. Ongoing U.S. aid via the FY2026 NDAA provides weapons funding but not the binding bilateral pact akin to NATO commitments, leaving slim prospects absent a diplomatic breakthrough.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$133,412結束日期
2026-12-31市場開放時間
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects an 89% implied probability against the U.S. formally committing to a Ukraine security guarantee by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral negotiations amid stringent conditions. On March 25, President Zelenskyy revealed to Reuters that the Trump administration links such guarantees—potentially for 15 years—to Kyiv ceding all of Donbas to Russia as part of a peace deal, a demand Ukraine has rejected as undermining its defensive positions and European security. Despite Zelenskyy's January claim that a document was "100% ready," no signing has occurred, with talks prioritizing peace agreement resolution first. Ongoing U.S. aid via the FY2026 NDAA provides weapons funding but not the binding bilateral pact akin to NATO commitments, leaving slim prospects absent a diplomatic breakthrough.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要 · 更新於
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