Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee at just 10.5% likelihood by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral talks under the Trump administration. President Zelenskyy's March 25 Reuters interview revealed U.S. proposals conditioning guarantees on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia, a demand he rejected as undermining defensive lines and European security. Secretary of State Marco Rubio affirmed mediation efforts prioritizing negotiations over unconditional commitments, while recent envoy calls with Zelenskyy yielded no breakthrough. Ongoing Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding via the FY2026 NDAA provides arms support but falls short of formal guarantees. With under three months left and no signing imminent, traders anticipate persistent hurdles from territorial disputes and congressional reluctance for treaty-level pacts.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要 · 更新於美國同意在6月30日前向烏克蘭提供安全保證嗎？
美國同意在6月30日前向烏克蘭提供安全保證嗎？
是
$134,144 交易量
$134,144 交易量
2026-12-31
是
$134,144 交易量
$134,144 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee at just 10.5% likelihood by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral talks under the Trump administration. President Zelenskyy's March 25 Reuters interview revealed U.S. proposals conditioning guarantees on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia, a demand he rejected as undermining defensive lines and European security. Secretary of State Marco Rubio affirmed mediation efforts prioritizing negotiations over unconditional commitments, while recent envoy calls with Zelenskyy yielded no breakthrough. Ongoing Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding via the FY2026 NDAA provides arms support but falls short of formal guarantees. With under three months left and no signing imminent, traders anticipate persistent hurdles from territorial disputes and congressional reluctance for treaty-level pacts.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市場開放時間： Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
交易量
$134,144結束日期
2026-06-30市場開放時間
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee at just 10.5% likelihood by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral talks under the Trump administration. President Zelenskyy's March 25 Reuters interview revealed U.S. proposals conditioning guarantees on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia, a demand he rejected as undermining defensive lines and European security. Secretary of State Marco Rubio affirmed mediation efforts prioritizing negotiations over unconditional commitments, while recent envoy calls with Zelenskyy yielded no breakthrough. Ongoing Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding via the FY2026 NDAA provides arms support but falls short of formal guarantees. With under three months left and no signing imminent, traders anticipate persistent hurdles from territorial disputes and congressional reluctance for treaty-level pacts.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$134,144結束日期
2026-12-31市場開放時間
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine security guarantee at just 10.5% likelihood by June 30, driven by stalled bilateral talks under the Trump administration. President Zelenskyy's March 25 Reuters interview revealed U.S. proposals conditioning guarantees on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia, a demand he rejected as undermining defensive lines and European security. Secretary of State Marco Rubio affirmed mediation efforts prioritizing negotiations over unconditional commitments, while recent envoy calls with Zelenskyy yielded no breakthrough. Ongoing Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding via the FY2026 NDAA provides arms support but falls short of formal guarantees. With under three months left and no signing imminent, traders anticipate persistent hurdles from territorial disputes and congressional reluctance for treaty-level pacts.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要 · 更新於
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