Trader consensus reflects 96.3% implied probability on "No" for Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any confirmed deliberate actions despite IRGC threats in late March to target submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea amid escalating US-Iran conflict. Ongoing hostilities have halted projects like Meta's 2Africa Pearls without verified cuts, as historical precedents show deliberate sabotage rare due to mutual retaliation risks, self-inflicted connectivity harm to Iran, and attribution challenges favoring accidents like anchor drags. Recent fact-checks debunk exaggerated viral claims of imminent global blackouts. Realistic shifts could stem from late escalation, such as proxy Houthi strikes or direct IRGC naval operations credibly linked to Iran before the deadline.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於是
$97,158 交易量
$97,158 交易量
2026-04-30
是
$97,158 交易量
$97,158 交易量
2026-04-30
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus reflects 96.3% implied probability on "No" for Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any confirmed deliberate actions despite IRGC threats in late March to target submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea amid escalating US-Iran conflict. Ongoing hostilities have halted projects like Meta's 2Africa Pearls without verified cuts, as historical precedents show deliberate sabotage rare due to mutual retaliation risks, self-inflicted connectivity harm to Iran, and attribution challenges favoring accidents like anchor drags. Recent fact-checks debunk exaggerated viral claims of imminent global blackouts. Realistic shifts could stem from late escalation, such as proxy Houthi strikes or direct IRGC naval operations credibly linked to Iran before the deadline.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市場開放時間： Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
交易量
$97,158結束日期
2026-04-30市場開放時間
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus reflects 96.3% implied probability on "No" for Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any confirmed deliberate actions despite IRGC threats in late March to target submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea amid escalating US-Iran conflict. Ongoing hostilities have halted projects like Meta's 2Africa Pearls without verified cuts, as historical precedents show deliberate sabotage rare due to mutual retaliation risks, self-inflicted connectivity harm to Iran, and attribution challenges favoring accidents like anchor drags. Recent fact-checks debunk exaggerated viral claims of imminent global blackouts. Realistic shifts could stem from late escalation, such as proxy Houthi strikes or direct IRGC naval operations credibly linked to Iran before the deadline.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$97,158結束日期
2026-04-30市場開放時間
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus reflects 96.3% implied probability on "No" for Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any confirmed deliberate actions despite IRGC threats in late March to target submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea amid escalating US-Iran conflict. Ongoing hostilities have halted projects like Meta's 2Africa Pearls without verified cuts, as historical precedents show deliberate sabotage rare due to mutual retaliation risks, self-inflicted connectivity harm to Iran, and attribution challenges favoring accidents like anchor drags. Recent fact-checks debunk exaggerated viral claims of imminent global blackouts. Realistic shifts could stem from late escalation, such as proxy Houthi strikes or direct IRGC naval operations credibly linked to Iran before the deadline.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於
警惕外部連結哦。
警惕外部連結哦。
Frequently Asked Questions