Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects low implied probability for direct Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, 2025, amid de-escalation signals following Israel's limited October 2024 strikes on Iranian missile sites and Tehran's restrained proxy responses via Hezbollah and Houthis. Key drivers include stalled Gaza ceasefire talks, U.S. President-elect Trump's pro-Israel stance potentially deterring Tehran, and Iran's economic strains limiting appetite for full-scale retaliation. Recent IAEA reports highlight Iran's uranium enrichment advances, raising nuclear tensions but not immediate strike triggers. Upcoming catalysts: January 2025 Trump inauguration and potential Lebanon truce could further suppress odds, though Syrian border incidents or failed diplomacy might shift sentiment rapidly.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要 · 更新於$2,328,077 交易量
Saudi Arabia
91%
Bahrain
79%
UAE
78%
Iraq
47%
Jordan
38%
Azerbaijan
14%
Oman
22%
土耳其
7%
敘利亞
4%
黎巴嫩
4%
賽普勒斯
3%
巴基斯坦
3%
葉門
3%
Armenia
3%
Ukraine
2%
英國
2%
Germany
2%
Hungary
2%
阿富汗
1%
Spain
1%
Italy
1%
Georgia
1%
Poland
1%
印度
1%
France
1%
$2,328,077 交易量
Saudi Arabia
91%
Bahrain
79%
UAE
78%
Iraq
47%
Jordan
38%
Azerbaijan
14%
Oman
22%
土耳其
7%
敘利亞
4%
黎巴嫩
4%
賽普勒斯
3%
巴基斯坦
3%
葉門
3%
Armenia
3%
Ukraine
2%
英國
2%
Germany
2%
Hungary
2%
阿富汗
1%
Spain
1%
Italy
1%
Georgia
1%
Poland
1%
印度
1%
France
1%
For the purposes of this market, a qualifying "strike" is defined as the use of aerial bombs, drones or missiles (including cruise or ballistic missiles) launched by Iranian military forces that impact a listed country's ground territory or any official embassy or consulate of that country (e.g., if a weapons depot on a listed country soil is hit by an Iranian missile, this market will resolve to "Yes").
Missiles or drones which are intercepted and surface-to-air missile strikes will not be sufficient for a "Yes" resolution regardless of whether they land on a listed country's territory or cause damage.
Strikes within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, will be counted as Israel.
Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market.
Actions such as artillery fire, small arms fire, FPV or ATGM strikes directly, ground incursions, naval shelling, cyberattacks, or other operations conducted by US or Israeli ground operatives will not qualify.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
If the date/time of a strike cannot be confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting by the end of the third calendar date after this market's end date, it will resolve to "No" regardless of whether a strike was later confirmed to have taken place.
市場開放時間: Feb 28, 2026, 11:33 AM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...已提議結果: 是
無爭議
最終結果: 是
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket reflects low implied probability for direct Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, 2025, amid de-escalation signals following Israel's limited October 2024 strikes on Iranian missile sites and Tehran's restrained proxy responses via Hezbollah and Houthis. Key drivers include stalled Gaza ceasefire talks, U.S. President-elect Trump's pro-Israel stance potentially deterring Tehran, and Iran's economic strains limiting appetite for full-scale retaliation. Recent IAEA reports highlight Iran's uranium enrichment advances, raising nuclear tensions but not immediate strike triggers. Upcoming catalysts: January 2025 Trump inauguration and potential Lebanon truce could further suppress odds, though Syrian border incidents or failed diplomacy might shift sentiment rapidly.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要 · 更新於
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