Trader consensus on Polymarket prices a low probability for direct Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, 2025, reflecting mutual deterrence after Iran's April 2024 drone and missile barrage and Israel's limited retaliation. Key drivers include ongoing proxy skirmishes via Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, alongside Israeli airstrikes on Iranian assets in Syria, which have heightened rhetoric but avoided full escalation. Recent developments, such as Israel's targeted killings of Hezbollah commanders, have prompted Iranian warnings without triggering direct response. Upcoming factors like potential U.S. policy shifts post-election or Gaza ceasefire talks could influence tensions, though historical patterns suggest restraint to prevent broader regional war.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket · Mis à jour$2,274,268 Vol.
UAE
98%
Saudi Arabia
98%
Bahrain
66%
Iraq
62%
Jordan
40%
Oman
11%
Turquie
7%
Azerbaijan
7%
Liban
6%
Syrie
5%
Afghanistan
4%
Chypre
3%
Pakistan
3%
Yémen
3%
Armenia
3%
Spain
3%
Royaume-Uni
2%
Hungary
2%
Italy
2%
Ukraine
1%
Inde
1%
Georgia
1%
France
1%
Germany
1%
Poland
1%
$2,274,268 Vol.
UAE
98%
Saudi Arabia
98%
Bahrain
66%
Iraq
62%
Jordan
40%
Oman
11%
Turquie
7%
Azerbaijan
7%
Liban
6%
Syrie
5%
Afghanistan
4%
Chypre
3%
Pakistan
3%
Yémen
3%
Armenia
3%
Spain
3%
Royaume-Uni
2%
Hungary
2%
Italy
2%
Ukraine
1%
Inde
1%
Georgia
1%
France
1%
Germany
1%
Poland
1%
For the purposes of this market, a qualifying "strike" is defined as the use of aerial bombs, drones or missiles (including cruise or ballistic missiles) launched by Iranian military forces that impact a listed country's ground territory or any official embassy or consulate of that country (e.g., if a weapons depot on a listed country soil is hit by an Iranian missile, this market will resolve to "Yes").
Missiles or drones which are intercepted and surface-to-air missile strikes will not be sufficient for a "Yes" resolution regardless of whether they land on a listed country's territory or cause damage.
Strikes within the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, will be counted as Israel.
Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market.
Actions such as artillery fire, small arms fire, FPV or ATGM strikes directly, ground incursions, naval shelling, cyberattacks, or other operations conducted by US or Israeli ground operatives will not qualify.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
If the date/time of a strike cannot be confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting by the end of the third calendar date after this market's end date, it will resolve to "No" regardless of whether a strike was later confirmed to have taken place.
Marché ouvert : Feb 28, 2026, 11:33 AM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus on Polymarket prices a low probability for direct Iranian military action against Israel by March 31, 2025, reflecting mutual deterrence after Iran's April 2024 drone and missile barrage and Israel's limited retaliation. Key drivers include ongoing proxy skirmishes via Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, alongside Israeli airstrikes on Iranian assets in Syria, which have heightened rhetoric but avoided full escalation. Recent developments, such as Israel's targeted killings of Hezbollah commanders, have prompted Iranian warnings without triggering direct response. Upcoming factors like potential U.S. policy shifts post-election or Gaza ceasefire talks could influence tensions, though historical patterns suggest restraint to prevent broader regional war.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket · Mis à jour
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