Traders' strong consensus favoring "No" at 94% stems from the absence of any verified Iranian threats, intelligence reports, or naval deployments targeting undersea internet cables, despite heightened Middle East tensions following Iran's April 13 missile and drone strikes on Israel and subsequent U.S.-Israeli responses. No official statements from Tehran indicate intent for such sabotage, which would require significant blue-water naval capabilities Iran lacks for distant cables. Recent developments, including U.S. sanctions on Iranian cyber entities and Houthi Red Sea disruptions without cable impacts, have not escalated to confirmed infrastructure risks. With no scheduled events signaling change by April 30, market pricing reflects low probability of this specific retaliation amid broader diplomatic de-escalation efforts.
Experimentelle KI-generierte Zusammenfassung mit Polymarket-Daten · AktualisiertWird der Iran bis zum 30. April Unterwasser-Internetkabel sabotieren?
Wird der Iran bis zum 30. April Unterwasser-Internetkabel sabotieren?
Ja
Ja
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Markt eröffnet: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Traders' strong consensus favoring "No" at 94% stems from the absence of any verified Iranian threats, intelligence reports, or naval deployments targeting undersea internet cables, despite heightened Middle East tensions following Iran's April 13 missile and drone strikes on Israel and subsequent U.S.-Israeli responses. No official statements from Tehran indicate intent for such sabotage, which would require significant blue-water naval capabilities Iran lacks for distant cables. Recent developments, including U.S. sanctions on Iranian cyber entities and Houthi Red Sea disruptions without cable impacts, have not escalated to confirmed infrastructure risks. With no scheduled events signaling change by April 30, market pricing reflects low probability of this specific retaliation amid broader diplomatic de-escalation efforts.
Experimentelle KI-generierte Zusammenfassung mit Polymarket-Daten · Aktualisiert
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