This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices low probabilities for a Russian nuclear test through late 2026, driven by the absence of any verified non-combat nuclear detonation despite heightened tensions following New START's February expiry. Russia's May 12 successful test-launch of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, hailed by President Putin as deployable by year-end, along with nuclear-capable missile exercises at the Kura range from May 6-10 ahead of Victory Day, signal strategic posturing but fall short of fission or fusion explosions. Defense Minister Belousov's late 2025 proposal to ready Novaya Zemlya infrastructure persists without activation, amid CTBTO monitoring and diplomatic backlash risks since Russia's 2023 CTBT withdrawal. Escalation in Ukraine or U.S. testing could shift dynamics before December deadlines.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Trader consensus prices low probabilities for a Russian nuclear test through late 2026, driven by the absence of any verified non-combat nuclear detonation despite heightened tensions following New START's February expiry. Russia's May 12 successful test-launch of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, hailed by President Putin as deployable by year-end, along with nuclear-capable missile exercises at the Kura range from May 6-10 ahead of Victory Day, signal strategic posturing but fall short of fission or fusion explosions. Defense Minister Belousov's late 2025 proposal to ready Novaya Zemlya infrastructure persists without activation, amid CTBTO monitoring and diplomatic backlash risks since Russia's 2023 CTBT withdrawal. Escalation in Ukraine or U.S. testing could shift dynamics before December deadlines.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено
May 12 2026
Russia successfully test-fires the new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, with President Putin announcing deployment planned by the end of 2026
While the test demonstrated modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces, it was a missile launch without a nuclear detonation, maintaining low market odds for a nuclear test.
May 12 2026
Russian President Vladimir Putin announces successful test launch of the new Sarmat strategic nuclear missile and confirms deployment planned by year-end, emphasizing
September 30, 2026 dips to 5%1%
Russian President Vladimir Putin announces successful test launch of the new Sarmat strategic nuclear missile and confirms deployment planned by year-end, emphasizing modernization without conducting a nuclear test
May 11 2026
Market experiences a brief spike in probability (from 1% to 39%) possibly reflecting short-term speculation or rumors, but no verifiable nuclear test news emerges, and the
June 30, 2026 surges to 39%38%
Market experiences a brief spike in probability (from 1% to 39%) possibly reflecting short-term speculation or rumors, but no verifiable nuclear test news emerges, and the
May 6 2026
Russia conducts missile tests at the Kura range in Kamchatka, including launches of nuclear-capable missiles ahead of Victory Day celebrations
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%4%
These tests involved missile launches capable of carrying nuclear warheads but did not include any nuclear detonations, signaling escalation but not a nuclear test.
May 6 2026
Russian Ministry of Defence announces ballistic missile tests at the Kura range, signaling military strength but not involving nuclear detonations, maintaining low market
September 30, 2026 dips to 4%2%
Russian Ministry of Defence announces ballistic missile tests at the Kura range, signaling military strength but not involving nuclear detonations, maintaining low market expectations for a nuclear test
May 6 2026
Russia conducts nuclear-capable missile tests ahead of Victory Day Parade but does not conduct any nuclear detonations, demonstrating military capability without crossing the
Russia conducts nuclear-capable missile tests ahead of Victory Day Parade but does not conduct any nuclear detonations, demonstrating military capability without crossing the nuclear test threshold, which likely kept the market probability low
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 29 2026
The head of the organization overseeing the nuclear test ban treaty reiterates warnings that a nuclear test by Russia or the U.S.
would lead to other nations following suit, reinforcing the global norm against testing and reducing market expectations for a Russian test
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 21 2026
Rafael Grossi, head of the organization overseeing the nuclear test ban treaty, warns that any nuclear test by the U.S., Russia, or others would trigger a global cascade of tests,
Rafael Grossi, head of the organization overseeing the nuclear test ban treaty, warns that any nuclear test by the U.S., Russia, or others would trigger a global cascade of tests, emphasizing the high stakes and deterring Russia from testing
Apr 21 2026
Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency warns that renewed nuclear testing by the U.S.
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
or Russia would trigger global proliferation, highlighting Russia’s 2023 revocation of its nuclear test ban treaty ratification and raising international alarm about potential tests
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Mar 31 2026
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear weapons systems and ongoing modernization efforts without confirmed nuclear detonations
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
This official assessment highlighted Russia’s struggles with new nuclear system tests, reducing market confidence in an imminent nuclear test.
Mar 31 2026
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear weapons systems and ongoing modernization efforts without
September 30, 2026 plunges to 10%41%
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear weapons systems and ongoing modernization efforts without confirmed nuclear detonations, reducing market confidence in an imminent Russian nuclear test
Mar 30 2026
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov announces Moscow will continue notifying the U.S.
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
of missile launches despite suspending the last nuclear arms control treaty, signaling ongoing restraint in nuclear activities despite treaty tensions
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices low probabilities for a Russian nuclear test through late 2026, driven by the absence of any verified non-combat nuclear detonation despite heightened tensions following New START's February expiry. Russia's May 12 successful test-launch of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, hailed by President Putin as deployable by year-end, along with nuclear-capable missile exercises at the Kura range from May 6-10 ahead of Victory Day, signal strategic posturing but fall short of fission or fusion explosions. Defense Minister Belousov's late 2025 proposal to ready Novaya Zemlya infrastructure persists without activation, amid CTBTO monitoring and diplomatic backlash risks since Russia's 2023 CTBT withdrawal. Escalation in Ukraine or U.S. testing could shift dynamics before December deadlines.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Trader consensus prices low probabilities for a Russian nuclear test through late 2026, driven by the absence of any verified non-combat nuclear detonation despite heightened tensions following New START's February expiry. Russia's May 12 successful test-launch of the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, hailed by President Putin as deployable by year-end, along with nuclear-capable missile exercises at the Kura range from May 6-10 ahead of Victory Day, signal strategic posturing but fall short of fission or fusion explosions. Defense Minister Belousov's late 2025 proposal to ready Novaya Zemlya infrastructure persists without activation, amid CTBTO monitoring and diplomatic backlash risks since Russia's 2023 CTBT withdrawal. Escalation in Ukraine or U.S. testing could shift dynamics before December deadlines.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено
May 12 2026
Russia successfully test-fires the new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, with President Putin announcing deployment planned by the end of 2026
While the test demonstrated modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces, it was a missile launch without a nuclear detonation, maintaining low market odds for a nuclear test.
May 12 2026
Russian President Vladimir Putin announces successful test launch of the new Sarmat strategic nuclear missile and confirms deployment planned by year-end, emphasizing
September 30, 2026 dips to 5%1%
Russian President Vladimir Putin announces successful test launch of the new Sarmat strategic nuclear missile and confirms deployment planned by year-end, emphasizing modernization without conducting a nuclear test
May 11 2026
Market experiences a brief spike in probability (from 1% to 39%) possibly reflecting short-term speculation or rumors, but no verifiable nuclear test news emerges, and the
June 30, 2026 surges to 39%38%
Market experiences a brief spike in probability (from 1% to 39%) possibly reflecting short-term speculation or rumors, but no verifiable nuclear test news emerges, and the
May 6 2026
Russia conducts missile tests at the Kura range in Kamchatka, including launches of nuclear-capable missiles ahead of Victory Day celebrations
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%4%
These tests involved missile launches capable of carrying nuclear warheads but did not include any nuclear detonations, signaling escalation but not a nuclear test.
May 6 2026
Russian Ministry of Defence announces ballistic missile tests at the Kura range, signaling military strength but not involving nuclear detonations, maintaining low market
September 30, 2026 dips to 4%2%
Russian Ministry of Defence announces ballistic missile tests at the Kura range, signaling military strength but not involving nuclear detonations, maintaining low market expectations for a nuclear test
May 6 2026
Russia conducts nuclear-capable missile tests ahead of Victory Day Parade but does not conduct any nuclear detonations, demonstrating military capability without crossing the
Russia conducts nuclear-capable missile tests ahead of Victory Day Parade but does not conduct any nuclear detonations, demonstrating military capability without crossing the nuclear test threshold, which likely kept the market probability low
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 29 2026
The head of the organization overseeing the nuclear test ban treaty reiterates warnings that a nuclear test by Russia or the U.S.
would lead to other nations following suit, reinforcing the global norm against testing and reducing market expectations for a Russian test
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 21 2026
Rafael Grossi, head of the organization overseeing the nuclear test ban treaty, warns that any nuclear test by the U.S., Russia, or others would trigger a global cascade of tests,
Rafael Grossi, head of the organization overseeing the nuclear test ban treaty, warns that any nuclear test by the U.S., Russia, or others would trigger a global cascade of tests, emphasizing the high stakes and deterring Russia from testing
Apr 21 2026
Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency warns that renewed nuclear testing by the U.S.
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
or Russia would trigger global proliferation, highlighting Russia’s 2023 revocation of its nuclear test ban treaty ratification and raising international alarm about potential tests
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Mar 31 2026
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear weapons systems and ongoing modernization efforts without confirmed nuclear detonations
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
This official assessment highlighted Russia’s struggles with new nuclear system tests, reducing market confidence in an imminent nuclear test.
Mar 31 2026
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear weapons systems and ongoing modernization efforts without
September 30, 2026 plunges to 10%41%
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear weapons systems and ongoing modernization efforts without confirmed nuclear detonations, reducing market confidence in an imminent Russian nuclear test
Mar 30 2026
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov announces Moscow will continue notifying the U.S.
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
of missile launches despite suspending the last nuclear arms control treaty, signaling ongoing restraint in nuclear activities despite treaty tensions
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Часті запитання
«Ядерне випробування Росії...?» — це ринок прогнозів на Polymarket з 6 можливими результатами, де трейдери купують і продають акції залежно від того, що, на їхню думку, станеться. Поточний лідер — «31 грудня 2026 року» з 8%, далі «30 вересня 2026 року» з 5%. Ціни відображають краудсорсингові ймовірності в реальному часі. Акції правильного результату погашаються по $1 кожна при вирішенні ринку.
Станом на сьогодні, «Ядерне випробування Росії...?» згенерував $1.4 million загального обсягу торгів з моменту запуску ринку Nov 5, 2025. Цей рівень торгової активності відображає сильну залученість спільноти Polymarket та забезпечує, що поточні шанси базуються на глибокому пулі учасників ринку. Ви можете відстежувати рухи цін наживо та торгувати будь-яким результатом прямо на цій сторінці.
Щоб торгувати на «Ядерне випробування Росії...?», перегляньте 6 доступних результатів на цій сторінці. Кожен результат відображає поточну ціну — ймовірність ринку. Оберіть результат, оберіть «Так» чи «Ні», введіть суму та натисніть «Торгувати». Якщо ваш вибір правильний при вирішенні, акції «Так» виплачують $1. Якщо ні — $0. Ви також можете продати акції в будь-який час до вирішення.
Це відкритий ринок. Поточний лідер для «Ядерне випробування Росії...?» — «31 грудня 2026 року» лише з 8%, а «30 вересня 2026 року» — близько позаду з 5%. Жоден результат не має впевненої більшості — трейдери вважають це дуже невизначеним.
Правила вирішення для «Ядерне випробування Росії...?» точно визначають, що має статися для оголошення переможця — включаючи офіційні джерела даних. Ви можете переглянути повні критерії вирішення в розділі «Правила» на цій сторінці. Рекомендуємо уважно прочитати правила перед торгівлею.
Так. Вам не потрібно торгувати, щоб бути в курсі. Ця сторінка служить трекером наживо для «Ядерне випробування Росії...?». Ймовірності результатів оновлюються в реальному часі з новими угодами. Збережіть сторінку та перегляньте коментарі інших трейдерів.
Шанси Polymarket встановлюються реальними трейдерами, які вкладають реальні гроші, що сприяє точним прогнозам. З $1.4 million торгового обсягу на «Ядерне випробування Росії...?» ці ціни агрегують колективні знання тисяч учасників. Polymarket має місячний показник точності 94%. Для актуальної статистики точності відвідайте сторінку точності на Polymarket.
Щоб зробити першу угоду на «Ядерне випробування Росії...?», зареєструйте безкоштовний акаунт на Polymarket та поповніть його криптою, кредитною чи дебетовою карткою або банківським переказом. Після поповнення поверніться на цю сторінку, оберіть результат, введіть суму та натисніть «Торгувати». Якщо ви новачок на ринках прогнозів, натисніть «Як це працює» вгорі будь-якої сторінки Polymarket.
На Polymarket ціна кожного результату відображає ймовірність ринку. Ціна 8¢ для «31 грудня 2026 року» на ринку «Ядерне випробування Росії...?» означає, що трейдери колективно оцінюють шанс цього результату приблизно в 8%. Якщо ви купите акції «Так» за 8¢ і результат правильний, ви отримаєте $1.00 за акцію — прибуток 92¢ за акцію.
Запланована дата завершення ринку «Ядерне випробування Росії...?» минула, але ринок ще не вирішено офіційно. Ринок залишається відкритим для торгівлі до офіційного вирішення. Перевірте статус вирішення та розділ «Правила» на цій сторінці.
Ринок «Ядерне випробування Росії...?» має зростаюча дискусія з 7 коментарями, де трейдери діляться аналізом, обговорюють результати та останні новини. Прокрутіть вниз до розділу коментарів. Ви також можете фільтрувати за «Топ власники» або переглянути вкладку «Активність» для стрічки угод у реальному часі.
Polymarket — найбільший ринок прогнозів у світі, де ви можете бути в курсі подій та заробляти на знаннях реальних подій. Трейдери купують і продають акції на результати тем від політики та виборів до крипто, фінансів, спорту, технологій та культури, включаючи ринки, як «Ядерне випробування Росії...?». Ціни відображають краудсорсингові ймовірності в реальному часі.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Часті запитання