Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security guarantee by June 30 at only 16.5% likelihood, driven by stalled negotiations despite President Zelenskyy's recent appeals, including his late-May White House visit and interviews expressing cautious optimism for a pact similar to those signed by European allies like Germany and France. The Biden administration has pursued discussions but offered limited assurances short of NATO Article 5-style commitments, citing U.S. election uncertainties and reluctance to bind a potential incoming Trump team skeptical of Ukraine aid. With under two weeks remaining and no draft or signing announced, congressional appropriations debates and the June 24-26 NATO summit in Washington loom as final hurdles, yet traders see significant barriers to resolution.
Experimentelle KI-generierte Zusammenfassung mit Polymarket-Daten · AktualisiertSind die USA bereit, der Ukraine bis zum 30. Juni eine Sicherheitsgarantie zu geben?
Sind die USA bereit, der Ukraine bis zum 30. Juni eine Sicherheitsgarantie zu geben?
Ja
$128,287 Vol.
$128,287 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
Ja
$128,287 Vol.
$128,287 Vol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security guarantee by June 30 at only 16.5% likelihood, driven by stalled negotiations despite President Zelenskyy's recent appeals, including his late-May White House visit and interviews expressing cautious optimism for a pact similar to those signed by European allies like Germany and France. The Biden administration has pursued discussions but offered limited assurances short of NATO Article 5-style commitments, citing U.S. election uncertainties and reluctance to bind a potential incoming Trump team skeptical of Ukraine aid. With under two weeks remaining and no draft or signing announced, congressional appropriations debates and the June 24-26 NATO summit in Washington loom as final hurdles, yet traders see significant barriers to resolution.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Markt eröffnet: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
Volumen
$128,287Enddatum
Jun 30, 2026Markt eröffnet
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security guarantee by June 30 at only 16.5% likelihood, driven by stalled negotiations despite President Zelenskyy's recent appeals, including his late-May White House visit and interviews expressing cautious optimism for a pact similar to those signed by European allies like Germany and France. The Biden administration has pursued discussions but offered limited assurances short of NATO Article 5-style commitments, citing U.S. election uncertainties and reluctance to bind a potential incoming Trump team skeptical of Ukraine aid. With under two weeks remaining and no draft or signing announced, congressional appropriations debates and the June 24-26 NATO summit in Washington loom as final hurdles, yet traders see significant barriers to resolution.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$128,287Enddatum
Dec 31, 2026Markt eröffnet
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security guarantee by June 30 at only 16.5% likelihood, driven by stalled negotiations despite President Zelenskyy's recent appeals, including his late-May White House visit and interviews expressing cautious optimism for a pact similar to those signed by European allies like Germany and France. The Biden administration has pursued discussions but offered limited assurances short of NATO Article 5-style commitments, citing U.S. election uncertainties and reluctance to bind a potential incoming Trump team skeptical of Ukraine aid. With under two weeks remaining and no draft or signing announced, congressional appropriations debates and the June 24-26 NATO summit in Washington loom as final hurdles, yet traders see significant barriers to resolution.
Experimentelle KI-generierte Zusammenfassung mit Polymarket-Daten · Aktualisiert
Vorsicht bei externen Links.
Vorsicht bei externen Links.
Häufig gestellte Fragen