**US intelligence assessments, including the March 2026 ODNI Annual Threat Assessment, form the core driver behind the 90.5% “No” odds.** Beijing shows no fixed timetable for unification and continues to prioritize coercive gray-zone measures—such as normalized but recently reduced PLA air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, routine China Coast Guard patrols near outlying islands, and large-scale blockade simulations from late 2025—over kinetic conflict. Recent patterns through mid-2026 reflect tactical adjustments rather than mobilization for imminent action, while high economic and military risks, including potential US intervention, reinforce trader consensus that a clash remains improbable before year-end. Scheduled diplomatic and electoral developments, including focus on Taiwan’s 2028 vote, further align with this view of continuity over escalation.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于是
$1,889,547 交易量
$1,889,547 交易量
2026-12-31
是
$1,889,547 交易量
$1,889,547 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.**US intelligence assessments, including the March 2026 ODNI Annual Threat Assessment, form the core driver behind the 90.5% “No” odds.** Beijing shows no fixed timetable for unification and continues to prioritize coercive gray-zone measures—such as normalized but recently reduced PLA air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, routine China Coast Guard patrols near outlying islands, and large-scale blockade simulations from late 2025—over kinetic conflict.
Recent patterns through mid-2026 reflect tactical adjustments rather than mobilization for imminent action, while high economic and military risks, including potential US intervention, reinforce trader consensus that a clash remains improbable before year-end. Scheduled diplomatic and electoral developments, including focus on Taiwan’s 2028 vote, further align with this view of continuity over escalation.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
市场开放时间： Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ET
交易量
$1,889,547结束日期
2026-12-31市场开放时间
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.**US intelligence assessments, including the March 2026 ODNI Annual Threat Assessment, form the core driver behind the 90.5% “No” odds.** Beijing shows no fixed timetable for unification and continues to prioritize coercive gray-zone measures—such as normalized but recently reduced PLA air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, routine China Coast Guard patrols near outlying islands, and large-scale blockade simulations from late 2025—over kinetic conflict.
Recent patterns through mid-2026 reflect tactical adjustments rather than mobilization for imminent action, while high economic and military risks, including potential US intervention, reinforce trader consensus that a clash remains improbable before year-end. Scheduled diplomatic and electoral developments, including focus on Taiwan’s 2028 vote, further align with this view of continuity over escalation.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if there is a military encounter between the military forces of China (People's Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China) between November 11, 2025, and December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A "military encounter" is defined as any incident involving the use of force such as missile strikes, artillery fire, exchange of gunfire, or other forms of direct military engagement between Chinese and Taiwanese military forces. Non-violent actions, such as warning shots, artillery fire into uninhabited areas, or missile launches that land in territorial waters or pass through airspace, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution. Intentional ship ramming that results in significant damage to (e.g., a hole in the hull) or the sinking of a military ship by another will count toward a "Yes" resolution, however minor damage (scrapes, dents) will not.
Note: the China Coast Guard (CCG) is part of the military, however Taiwan's Coast Guard Administration (CGA) is not.
The resolution source for this market will be a consensus of credible reporting.
交易量
$1,889,548结束日期
2026-12-31市场开放时间
Nov 13, 2025, 5:55 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**US intelligence assessments, including the March 2026 ODNI Annual Threat Assessment, form the core driver behind the 90.5% “No” odds.** Beijing shows no fixed timetable for unification and continues to prioritize coercive gray-zone measures—such as normalized but recently reduced PLA air incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ, routine China Coast Guard patrols near outlying islands, and large-scale blockade simulations from late 2025—over kinetic conflict. Recent patterns through mid-2026 reflect tactical adjustments rather than mobilization for imminent action, while high economic and military risks, including potential US intervention, reinforce trader consensus that a clash remains improbable before year-end. Scheduled diplomatic and electoral developments, including focus on Taiwan’s 2028 vote, further align with this view of continuity over escalation.
基于Polymarket数据的AI实验性摘要。这不是交易建议，也不影响该市场的结算方式。 · 更新于
警惕外部链接哦。
警惕外部链接哦。
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