Despite mid-March 2026 protests in central Cuba—where demonstrators ransacked and torched a Communist Party office amid prolonged blackouts and food shortages triggered by fuel scarcity and U.S. oil restrictions—the government under President Miguel Díaz-Canel swiftly restored order, blaming external sanctions while rejecting any negotiation over its political system or leadership. No further widespread unrest or military defections have emerged since, with Russian oil shipments and humanitarian aid providing limited relief. Traders' 67.5% implied probability on "No" reflects the regime's historical resilience over six decades of pressures, intact security apparatus, and absence of elite fractures, though sustained economic crisis and U.S. policy shifts pose ongoing risks through year-end.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado¿Cae el régimen cubano en 2026?
¿Cae el régimen cubano en 2026?
Sí
$129,416 Vol.
$129,416 Vol.
31 dic 2026
Sí
$129,416 Vol.
$129,416 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Despite mid-March 2026 protests in central Cuba—where demonstrators ransacked and torched a Communist Party office amid prolonged blackouts and food shortages triggered by fuel scarcity and U.S. oil restrictions—the government under President Miguel Díaz-Canel swiftly restored order, blaming external sanctions while rejecting any negotiation over its political system or leadership. No further widespread unrest or military defections have emerged since, with Russian oil shipments and humanitarian aid providing limited relief. Traders' 67.5% implied probability on "No" reflects the regime's historical resilience over six decades of pressures, intact security apparatus, and absence of elite fractures, though sustained economic crisis and U.S. policy shifts pose ongoing risks through year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Volumen
$129,416Fecha de finalización
31 dic 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Despite mid-March 2026 protests in central Cuba—where demonstrators ransacked and torched a Communist Party office amid prolonged blackouts and food shortages triggered by fuel scarcity and U.S. oil restrictions—the government under President Miguel Díaz-Canel swiftly restored order, blaming external sanctions while rejecting any negotiation over its political system or leadership. No further widespread unrest or military defections have emerged since, with Russian oil shipments and humanitarian aid providing limited relief. Traders' 67.5% implied probability on "No" reflects the regime's historical resilience over six decades of pressures, intact security apparatus, and absence of elite fractures, though sustained economic crisis and U.S. policy shifts pose ongoing risks through year-end.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$129,416Fecha de finalización
31 dic 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Despite mid-March 2026 protests in central Cuba—where demonstrators ransacked and torched a Communist Party office amid prolonged blackouts and food shortages triggered by fuel scarcity and U.S. oil restrictions—the government under President Miguel Díaz-Canel swiftly restored order, blaming external sanctions while rejecting any negotiation over its political system or leadership. No further widespread unrest or military defections have emerged since, with Russian oil shipments and humanitarian aid providing limited relief. Traders' 67.5% implied probability on "No" reflects the regime's historical resilience over six decades of pressures, intact security apparatus, and absence of elite fractures, though sustained economic crisis and U.S. policy shifts pose ongoing risks through year-end.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
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