Trader consensus reflects a 34% implied probability for foreign intervention in Gaza by June 30—defined as non-Israeli, non-Palestinian police, security, or military personnel physically entering Gaza's terrestrial territory for an officially acknowledged operation—driven by accelerating pledges to the US-backed International Stabilization Force (ISF), including Kosovo's parliament unanimously approving dozens of troops on April 17, alongside prior commitments from Indonesia, Morocco, Albania, and Kazakhstan. No such deployment has materialized amid Gaza's phase-two ceasefire under UN Security Council Resolution 2803, with Hamas threatening attacks on any multinational force and humanitarian reports confirming ongoing fragility as of April 17; low 3% odds for April 30 underscore execution delays and logistical preparations like Jordan-based training. Potential May escalations or diplomatic breakthroughs could catalyze entry.
Polymarket verilerine atıfta bulunan deneysel AI tarafından oluşturulmuş özet. Bu bir işlem tavsiyesi değildir ve bu piyasanın nasıl çözümlendiğinde hiçbir rolü yoktur. · Güncellendi$539,850 Hac.

30 Nisan
1%

30 Haziran
34%
$539,850 Hac.

30 Nisan
1%

30 Haziran
34%
The foreign personnel must physically enter the terrestrial territory of the Gaza Strip to qualify. Entering the maritime territory, as occurred during the US’s attempt to construct a floating pier in 2024, or entering the airspace will not qualify.
Entering Israeli controlled buffer zones will not qualify.
Egyptian or other forces operating solely along the Egyptian/Gaza border will not qualify regardless of if they cross the border.
Foreign personnel carrying out individual special operations, diplomatic missions, or solely humanitarian operations will not qualify.
Qualifying deployments must involve active-duty personnel of at least one foreign state or international institution (e.g., the UN or multinational missions) who are officially sent to Gaza for an operational role (e.g., peacekeeping, convoy escort, detention, logistical support). To qualify, the deployment must occur within the specified timeframe; mere announcements will not suffice.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Piyasa Açıldı: Feb 18, 2026, 6:39 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The foreign personnel must physically enter the terrestrial territory of the Gaza Strip to qualify. Entering the maritime territory, as occurred during the US’s attempt to construct a floating pier in 2024, or entering the airspace will not qualify.
Entering Israeli controlled buffer zones will not qualify.
Egyptian or other forces operating solely along the Egyptian/Gaza border will not qualify regardless of if they cross the border.
Foreign personnel carrying out individual special operations, diplomatic missions, or solely humanitarian operations will not qualify.
Qualifying deployments must involve active-duty personnel of at least one foreign state or international institution (e.g., the UN or multinational missions) who are officially sent to Gaza for an operational role (e.g., peacekeeping, convoy escort, detention, logistical support). To qualify, the deployment must occur within the specified timeframe; mere announcements will not suffice.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus reflects a 34% implied probability for foreign intervention in Gaza by June 30—defined as non-Israeli, non-Palestinian police, security, or military personnel physically entering Gaza's terrestrial territory for an officially acknowledged operation—driven by accelerating pledges to the US-backed International Stabilization Force (ISF), including Kosovo's parliament unanimously approving dozens of troops on April 17, alongside prior commitments from Indonesia, Morocco, Albania, and Kazakhstan. No such deployment has materialized amid Gaza's phase-two ceasefire under UN Security Council Resolution 2803, with Hamas threatening attacks on any multinational force and humanitarian reports confirming ongoing fragility as of April 17; low 3% odds for April 30 underscore execution delays and logistical preparations like Jordan-based training. Potential May escalations or diplomatic breakthroughs could catalyze entry.
Polymarket verilerine atıfta bulunan deneysel AI tarafından oluşturulmuş özet. Bu bir işlem tavsiyesi değildir ve bu piyasanın nasıl çözümlendiğinde hiçbir rolü yoktur. · Güncellendi
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