This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Russia's Defense Minister Andrey Belousov recently proposed reactivating infrastructure at Novaya Zemlya, the Arctic nuclear test site, while announcing nuclear-capable missile tests at the Kura range in Kamchatka ongoing through May 10, 2026, ahead of the May 9 Victory Day parade. These steps follow President Putin's November 2025 directive for nuclear test proposals amid U.S.-Russia arms control breakdowns, including New START's February 2026 expiration and Russia's 2023 CTBT ratification revocation. No verified nuclear explosion has occurred since 1990, with trader sentiment reflecting heightened escalation signals in the Ukraine conflict rather than imminent detonation; CTBTO seismic monitoring and official announcements will determine resolution, alongside potential diplomatic responses from NATO allies.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Russia's Defense Minister Andrey Belousov recently proposed reactivating infrastructure at Novaya Zemlya, the Arctic nuclear test site, while announcing nuclear-capable missile tests at the Kura range in Kamchatka ongoing through May 10, 2026, ahead of the May 9 Victory Day parade. These steps follow President Putin's November 2025 directive for nuclear test proposals amid U.S.-Russia arms control breakdowns, including New START's February 2026 expiration and Russia's 2023 CTBT ratification revocation. No verified nuclear explosion has occurred since 1990, with trader sentiment reflecting heightened escalation signals in the Ukraine conflict rather than imminent detonation; CTBTO seismic monitoring and official announcements will determine resolution, alongside potential diplomatic responses from NATO allies.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · Atualizado
May 8 2026
No credible reports of Russian nuclear test by early May 2026
September 30, 2026 rises to 5%2%
By early May, no credible news sources reported any Russian nuclear test, and diplomatic warnings remained in place, keeping the market probability near its low point.
May 6 2026
Russia announces nuclear-capable missile tests at Kura range without nuclear detonation
September 30, 2026 dips to 3%2%
Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced missile tests at the Kura range from May 6 to 10, involving nuclear-capable missiles but no nuclear detonations. This showed Russia’s focus on missile testing rather than nuclear tests, further lowering market expectations.
May 6 2026
Continued Russian conventional military aggression and nuclear saber rattling reported without any nuclear test, alongside diplomatic efforts and international monitoring, keeping
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%1%
Continued Russian conventional military aggression and nuclear saber rattling reported without any nuclear test, alongside diplomatic efforts and international monitoring, keeping the market’s probability near historic lows
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
U.S. intelligence community reiterates Russia’s nuclear arsenal modernization without confirmed nuclear tests
September 30, 2026 dips to 5%2%
The May 1 report to Congress reiterated Russia’s modernization efforts and large nuclear arsenal but did not report any nuclear test, supporting the market’s continued low probability for a test by September.
May 1 2026
U.S. report to Congress reiterates Russia’s modernization of nuclear weapons amid multiple failed tests and no evidence of recent nuclear detonations, sustaining the market’s low
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. report to Congress reiterates Russia’s modernization of nuclear weapons amid multiple failed tests and no evidence of recent nuclear detonations, sustaining the market’s low probability for a test
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 26 2026
Russia announces missile tests at the Kura range involving nuclear-capable systems but no confirmed nuclear detonations, reinforcing the narrative of testing without actual
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
Russia announces missile tests at the Kura range involving nuclear-capable systems but no confirmed nuclear detonations, reinforcing the narrative of testing without actual nuclear explosions and maintaining low market probability
Apr 22 2026
U.S. Congressional report highlights Russia’s nuclear modernization amid failed tests but no new nuclear detonations
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%4%
The April 22 Congressional Research Service report detailed Russia’s ongoing nuclear weapons modernization despite multiple failed tests of new systems, with no indication of imminent nuclear testing. This reinforced market skepticism about a near-term test.
Apr 21 2026
Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, warns that any nuclear test by the U.S., Russia, or others would trigger a global cascade of tests, signaling strong
December 31, 2026 dips to 11%1%
Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, warns that any nuclear test by the U.S., Russia, or others would trigger a global cascade of tests, signaling strong international pressure against nuclear testing and contributing to market skepticism
Apr 21 2026
Head of organization overseeing nuclear test ban treaty warns US and Russia against nuclear tests
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
Rafael Grossi, IAEA Director General, warned at the UN that if the US, Russia, or any other nation resumes nuclear testing, it would trigger a global cascade of tests. This heightened diplomatic pressure likely contributed to the sharp drop in market probability from 51% to 9% in early April.
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Mar 31 2026
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear systems and ongoing modernization efforts without successful
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear systems and ongoing modernization efforts without successful detonations, lowering expectations of a near-term nuclear test by Russia
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Russia's Defense Minister Andrey Belousov recently proposed reactivating infrastructure at Novaya Zemlya, the Arctic nuclear test site, while announcing nuclear-capable missile tests at the Kura range in Kamchatka ongoing through May 10, 2026, ahead of the May 9 Victory Day parade. These steps follow President Putin's November 2025 directive for nuclear test proposals amid U.S.-Russia arms control breakdowns, including New START's February 2026 expiration and Russia's 2023 CTBT ratification revocation. No verified nuclear explosion has occurred since 1990, with trader sentiment reflecting heightened escalation signals in the Ukraine conflict rather than imminent detonation; CTBTO seismic monitoring and official announcements will determine resolution, alongside potential diplomatic responses from NATO allies.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Russia's Defense Minister Andrey Belousov recently proposed reactivating infrastructure at Novaya Zemlya, the Arctic nuclear test site, while announcing nuclear-capable missile tests at the Kura range in Kamchatka ongoing through May 10, 2026, ahead of the May 9 Victory Day parade. These steps follow President Putin's November 2025 directive for nuclear test proposals amid U.S.-Russia arms control breakdowns, including New START's February 2026 expiration and Russia's 2023 CTBT ratification revocation. No verified nuclear explosion has occurred since 1990, with trader sentiment reflecting heightened escalation signals in the Ukraine conflict rather than imminent detonation; CTBTO seismic monitoring and official announcements will determine resolution, alongside potential diplomatic responses from NATO allies.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · Atualizado
May 8 2026
No credible reports of Russian nuclear test by early May 2026
September 30, 2026 rises to 5%2%
By early May, no credible news sources reported any Russian nuclear test, and diplomatic warnings remained in place, keeping the market probability near its low point.
May 6 2026
Russia announces nuclear-capable missile tests at Kura range without nuclear detonation
September 30, 2026 dips to 3%2%
Russia’s Ministry of Defence announced missile tests at the Kura range from May 6 to 10, involving nuclear-capable missiles but no nuclear detonations. This showed Russia’s focus on missile testing rather than nuclear tests, further lowering market expectations.
May 6 2026
Continued Russian conventional military aggression and nuclear saber rattling reported without any nuclear test, alongside diplomatic efforts and international monitoring, keeping
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%1%
Continued Russian conventional military aggression and nuclear saber rattling reported without any nuclear test, alongside diplomatic efforts and international monitoring, keeping the market’s probability near historic lows
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
U.S. intelligence community reiterates Russia’s nuclear arsenal modernization without confirmed nuclear tests
September 30, 2026 dips to 5%2%
The May 1 report to Congress reiterated Russia’s modernization efforts and large nuclear arsenal but did not report any nuclear test, supporting the market’s continued low probability for a test by September.
May 1 2026
U.S. report to Congress reiterates Russia’s modernization of nuclear weapons amid multiple failed tests and no evidence of recent nuclear detonations, sustaining the market’s low
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. report to Congress reiterates Russia’s modernization of nuclear weapons amid multiple failed tests and no evidence of recent nuclear detonations, sustaining the market’s low probability for a test
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 26 2026
Russia announces missile tests at the Kura range involving nuclear-capable systems but no confirmed nuclear detonations, reinforcing the narrative of testing without actual
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
Russia announces missile tests at the Kura range involving nuclear-capable systems but no confirmed nuclear detonations, reinforcing the narrative of testing without actual nuclear explosions and maintaining low market probability
Apr 22 2026
U.S. Congressional report highlights Russia’s nuclear modernization amid failed tests but no new nuclear detonations
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%4%
The April 22 Congressional Research Service report detailed Russia’s ongoing nuclear weapons modernization despite multiple failed tests of new systems, with no indication of imminent nuclear testing. This reinforced market skepticism about a near-term test.
Apr 21 2026
Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, warns that any nuclear test by the U.S., Russia, or others would trigger a global cascade of tests, signaling strong
December 31, 2026 dips to 11%1%
Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, warns that any nuclear test by the U.S., Russia, or others would trigger a global cascade of tests, signaling strong international pressure against nuclear testing and contributing to market skepticism
Apr 21 2026
Head of organization overseeing nuclear test ban treaty warns US and Russia against nuclear tests
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
Rafael Grossi, IAEA Director General, warned at the UN that if the US, Russia, or any other nation resumes nuclear testing, it would trigger a global cascade of tests. This heightened diplomatic pressure likely contributed to the sharp drop in market probability from 51% to 9% in early April.
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Mar 31 2026
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear systems and ongoing modernization efforts without successful
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
U.S. intelligence community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment reports multiple failed tests of new Russian nuclear systems and ongoing modernization efforts without successful detonations, lowering expectations of a near-term nuclear test by Russia
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
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Cuidado com os links externos.
Frequently Asked Questions
"Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?" is a prediction market on Polymarket with 6 possible outcomes where traders buy and sell shares based on what they believe will happen. The current leading outcome is "31 de dezembro de 2026" at 8%, followed by "30 de setembro de 2026" at 5%. Prices reflect real-time crowd-sourced probabilities. For example, a share priced at 8¢ implies that the market collectively assigns a 8% chance to that outcome. These odds shift continuously as traders react to new developments and information. Shares in the correct outcome are redeemable for $1 each upon market resolution.
As of today, "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?" has generated $1.4 million in total trading volume since the market launched on Nov 5, 2025. This level of trading activity reflects strong engagement from the Polymarket community and helps ensure that the current odds are informed by a deep pool of market participants. You can track live price movements and trade on any outcome directly on this page.
To trade on "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?," browse the 6 available outcomes listed on this page. Each outcome displays a current price representing the market's implied probability. To take a position, select the outcome you believe is most likely, choose "Yes" to trade in favor of it or "No" to trade against it, enter your amount, and click "Trade." If your chosen outcome is correct when the market resolves, your "Yes" shares pay out $1 each. If it's incorrect, they pay out $0. You can also sell your shares at any time before resolution if you want to lock in a profit or cut a loss.
This is a wide-open market. The current leader for "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?" is "31 de dezembro de 2026" at just 8%, with "30 de setembro de 2026" close behind at 5%. With no outcome commanding a strong majority, traders see this as highly uncertain, which can present unique trading opportunities. These odds update in real-time, so bookmark this page to watch how the probabilities evolve.
The resolution rules for "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?" define exactly what needs to happen for each outcome to be declared a winner — including the official data sources used to determine the result. You can review the complete resolution criteria in the "Rules" section on this page above the comments. We recommend reading the rules carefully before trading, as they specify the precise conditions, edge cases, and sources that govern how this market is settled.
Yes. You don't need to trade to stay informed. This page serves as a live tracker for "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?." The outcome probabilities update in real-time as new trades come in. You can bookmark this page and check the comments section to see what other traders are saying. You can also use the time-range filters on the chart to see how the odds have shifted over time. It's a free, real-time window into what the market expects to happen.
Polymarket odds are set by real traders putting real money behind their beliefs, which tends to surface accurate predictions. With $1.4 million traded on “Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?,” these prices aggregate the collective knowledge and conviction of thousands of participants — often outperforming polls, expert forecasts, and traditional surveys. Prediction markets like Polymarket have a strong track record of accuracy, especially as events approach their resolution date. For example, Polymarket has a one month accuracy score of 94%. For the latest stats on Polymarket’s prediction accuracy, visit the accuracy page on Polymarket.
To place your first trade on "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?," sign up for a free Polymarket account and fund it using crypto, a credit or debit card, or a bank transfer. Once your account is funded, return to this page, select the outcome you want to trade, enter your amount, and click "Trade." If you're new to prediction markets, click the "How it works" link at the top of any Polymarket page for a quick step-by-step walkthrough of how trading works.
On Polymarket, the price of each outcome represents the market's implied probability. A price of 8¢ for "31 de dezembro de 2026" in the "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?" market means traders collectively believe there is roughly a 8% chance that "31 de dezembro de 2026" will be the correct result. If you buy "Yes" shares at 8¢ and the outcome is correct, you receive $1.00 per share — a profit of 92¢ per share. If incorrect, those shares are worth $0.
The "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?" market's scheduled end date has passed, but the market has not yet been officially resolved. The end date indicates when the underlying event is expected to occur or become knowable. It is not the moment trading stops. The market remains open for trading until the outcome is formally resolved through the resolution process. You can still buy, sell, or close your position while the market is pending resolution. Check the resolution status tracker and "Rules" section on this page for updates on the resolution timeline.
The "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?" market has a growing discussion of 7 comments where traders share their analysis, debate outcomes, and discuss breaking developments. Scroll down to the comments section below to read what other participants think. You can also filter by "Top Holders" to see what the market's biggest traders are positioned on, or check the "Activity" tab for a real-time feed of trades.
Polymarket is the world's largest prediction market, where you can stay informed and profit from your knowledge of real-world events. Traders buy and sell shares on outcomes for topics ranging from politics and elections to crypto, finance, sports, tech, and culture, including markets like "Teste nuclear da Rússia por...?." Prices reflect real-time, crowd-sourced probabilities backed by financial conviction, often providing faster and more accurate signals than polls, pundits, or traditional surveys.
Cuidado com os links externos.
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Frequently Asked Questions