The US-brokered Comprehensive Plan, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 in November 2025, calls for an International Stabilization Force drawn from countries including Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Morocco to secure Gaza under a Trump-chaired Board of Peace and transitional Palestinian technocratic administration. As of late May 2026, the force has not deployed despite earlier pledges, with the October 2025 ceasefire's second phase stalled over Hamas's rejection of foreign troops and full disarmament. Recent Israeli airstrikes, including the May 15 killing of a senior Hamas military leader in Gaza City, continue alongside limited operations, while Israel maintains control of roughly half the territory. Upcoming factors include potential Board of Peace meetings, aid delivery timelines, and any renewed diplomatic pressure that could advance or further delay ground operations by non-Israeli, non-Palestinian security personnel before the June 30 resolution window.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · Atualizado$613,513 Vol.

30 de junho
12%
$613,513 Vol.

30 de junho
12%
The foreign personnel must physically enter the terrestrial territory of the Gaza Strip to qualify. Entering the maritime territory, as occurred during the US’s attempt to construct a floating pier in 2024, or entering the airspace will not qualify.
Entering Israeli controlled buffer zones will not qualify.
Egyptian or other forces operating solely along the Egyptian/Gaza border will not qualify regardless of if they cross the border.
Foreign personnel carrying out individual special operations, diplomatic missions, or solely humanitarian operations will not qualify.
Qualifying deployments must involve active-duty personnel of at least one foreign state or international institution (e.g., the UN or multinational missions) who are officially sent to Gaza for an operational role (e.g., peacekeeping, convoy escort, detention, logistical support). To qualify, the deployment must occur within the specified timeframe; mere announcements will not suffice.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado Aberto: Feb 18, 2026, 6:39 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The foreign personnel must physically enter the terrestrial territory of the Gaza Strip to qualify. Entering the maritime territory, as occurred during the US’s attempt to construct a floating pier in 2024, or entering the airspace will not qualify.
Entering Israeli controlled buffer zones will not qualify.
Egyptian or other forces operating solely along the Egyptian/Gaza border will not qualify regardless of if they cross the border.
Foreign personnel carrying out individual special operations, diplomatic missions, or solely humanitarian operations will not qualify.
Qualifying deployments must involve active-duty personnel of at least one foreign state or international institution (e.g., the UN or multinational missions) who are officially sent to Gaza for an operational role (e.g., peacekeeping, convoy escort, detention, logistical support). To qualify, the deployment must occur within the specified timeframe; mere announcements will not suffice.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The US-brokered Comprehensive Plan, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 in November 2025, calls for an International Stabilization Force drawn from countries including Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and Morocco to secure Gaza under a Trump-chaired Board of Peace and transitional Palestinian technocratic administration. As of late May 2026, the force has not deployed despite earlier pledges, with the October 2025 ceasefire's second phase stalled over Hamas's rejection of foreign troops and full disarmament. Recent Israeli airstrikes, including the May 15 killing of a senior Hamas military leader in Gaza City, continue alongside limited operations, while Israel maintains control of roughly half the territory. Upcoming factors include potential Board of Peace meetings, aid delivery timelines, and any renewed diplomatic pressure that could advance or further delay ground operations by non-Israeli, non-Palestinian security personnel before the June 30 resolution window.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · Atualizado
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