US extended deterrence commitments continue to anchor allied security strategies amid regional threats from North Korea, China, and Iran, with no verified national programs or technical milestones indicating an independent nuclear acquisition by any US ally before 2027. Recent public debates in South Korea, where polls show elevated support for domestic capabilities, and statements from Polish and Japanese officials reflect hedging discussions rather than active weaponization efforts. US nuclear sharing arrangements with NATO partners and bilateral assurances have historically suppressed proliferation incentives, while the short remaining timeline limits feasible pathways even for states with advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure. Trader consensus at 90.1% for no reflects these structural and temporal barriers.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano$51,591 Wol.
$51,591 Wol.
Dec 31, 2026
$51,591 Wol.
$51,591 Wol.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments continue to anchor allied security strategies amid regional threats from North Korea, China, and Iran, with no verified national programs or technical milestones indicating an independent nuclear acquisition by any US ally before 2027. Recent public debates in South Korea, where polls show elevated support for domestic capabilities, and statements from Polish and Japanese officials reflect hedging discussions rather than active weaponization efforts. US nuclear sharing arrangements with NATO partners and bilateral assurances have historically suppressed proliferation incentives, while the short remaining timeline limits feasible pathways even for states with advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure. Trader consensus at 90.1% for no reflects these structural and temporal barriers.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Rynek otwarty: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Wolumen
$51,591Data zakończenia
Dec 31, 2026Rynek otwarty
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments continue to anchor allied security strategies amid regional threats from North Korea, China, and Iran, with no verified national programs or technical milestones indicating an independent nuclear acquisition by any US ally before 2027. Recent public debates in South Korea, where polls show elevated support for domestic capabilities, and statements from Polish and Japanese officials reflect hedging discussions rather than active weaponization efforts. US nuclear sharing arrangements with NATO partners and bilateral assurances have historically suppressed proliferation incentives, while the short remaining timeline limits feasible pathways even for states with advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure. Trader consensus at 90.1% for no reflects these structural and temporal barriers.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Wolumen
$51,591Data zakończenia
Dec 31, 2026Rynek otwarty
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...US extended deterrence commitments continue to anchor allied security strategies amid regional threats from North Korea, China, and Iran, with no verified national programs or technical milestones indicating an independent nuclear acquisition by any US ally before 2027. Recent public debates in South Korea, where polls show elevated support for domestic capabilities, and statements from Polish and Japanese officials reflect hedging discussions rather than active weaponization efforts. US nuclear sharing arrangements with NATO partners and bilateral assurances have historically suppressed proliferation incentives, while the short remaining timeline limits feasible pathways even for states with advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure. Trader consensus at 90.1% for no reflects these structural and temporal barriers.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano
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