**No** at 89.5% reflects the near-term barriers to any formal U.S. ally—primarily South Korea or Japan—achieving operational nuclear weapons by the end of 2026. Ongoing public and elite debates in Seoul, fueled by North Korean missile advances and questions over extended deterrence, have produced high polling support for an indigenous capability and limited official statements keeping options open. Tokyo has seen parallel but more restrained discussion of its non-nuclear principles. However, both countries remain NPT parties, face strict U.S. nuclear cooperation constraints, and lack active weapons-grade enrichment, testing, or weaponization programs that could deliver deployable systems before 2027. Recent U.S. approvals for South Korean civilian uranium enrichment and nuclear-powered submarines operate under safeguards and do not extend to armaments. The compressed timeframe, alliance commitments, and technical hurdles sustain the strong trader consensus against near-term acquisition.
Polymarket 데이터를 참조하는 실험적 AI 생성 요약입니다. 이것은 거래 조언이 아니며 이 마켓의 정산에 영향을 미치지 않습니다. · 업데이트$50,001 거래량
$50,001 거래량
2026.12.31
$50,001 거래량
$50,001 거래량
2026.12.31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**No** at 89.5% reflects the near-term barriers to any formal U.S. ally—primarily South Korea or Japan—achieving operational nuclear weapons by the end of 2026. Ongoing public and elite debates in Seoul, fueled by North Korean missile advances and questions over extended deterrence, have produced high polling support for an indigenous capability and limited official statements keeping options open. Tokyo has seen parallel but more restrained discussion of its non-nuclear principles. However, both countries remain NPT parties, face strict U.S. nuclear cooperation constraints, and lack active weapons-grade enrichment, testing, or weaponization programs that could deliver deployable systems before 2027. Recent U.S. approvals for South Korean civilian uranium enrichment and nuclear-powered submarines operate under safeguards and do not extend to armaments. The compressed timeframe, alliance commitments, and technical hurdles sustain the strong trader consensus against near-term acquisition.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
마켓 개설일: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
거래량
$50,001종료일
2026.12.31마켓 개설일
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**No** at 89.5% reflects the near-term barriers to any formal U.S. ally—primarily South Korea or Japan—achieving operational nuclear weapons by the end of 2026. Ongoing public and elite debates in Seoul, fueled by North Korean missile advances and questions over extended deterrence, have produced high polling support for an indigenous capability and limited official statements keeping options open. Tokyo has seen parallel but more restrained discussion of its non-nuclear principles. However, both countries remain NPT parties, face strict U.S. nuclear cooperation constraints, and lack active weapons-grade enrichment, testing, or weaponization programs that could deliver deployable systems before 2027. Recent U.S. approvals for South Korean civilian uranium enrichment and nuclear-powered submarines operate under safeguards and do not extend to armaments. The compressed timeframe, alliance commitments, and technical hurdles sustain the strong trader consensus against near-term acquisition.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
거래량
$50,001종료일
2026.12.31마켓 개설일
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**No** at 89.5% reflects the near-term barriers to any formal U.S. ally—primarily South Korea or Japan—achieving operational nuclear weapons by the end of 2026. Ongoing public and elite debates in Seoul, fueled by North Korean missile advances and questions over extended deterrence, have produced high polling support for an indigenous capability and limited official statements keeping options open. Tokyo has seen parallel but more restrained discussion of its non-nuclear principles. However, both countries remain NPT parties, face strict U.S. nuclear cooperation constraints, and lack active weapons-grade enrichment, testing, or weaponization programs that could deliver deployable systems before 2027. Recent U.S. approvals for South Korean civilian uranium enrichment and nuclear-powered submarines operate under safeguards and do not extend to armaments. The compressed timeframe, alliance commitments, and technical hurdles sustain the strong trader consensus against near-term acquisition.
Polymarket 데이터를 참조하는 실험적 AI 생성 요약입니다. 이것은 거래 조언이 아니며 이 마켓의 정산에 영향을 미치지 않습니다. · 업데이트
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