The Iranian regime's survival through the 2026 conflict with the United States and Israel, including the February assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and a subsequent leadership transition to his son Mojtaba, underpins the 87.5% trader consensus against collapse before 2027. Security forces remained cohesive during 2025–early 2026 protests, enabling a violent crackdown and internet restrictions that suppressed unrest by spring without significant defections or elite splits. An April ceasefire and renewed diplomatic channels have lowered escalation risks, while factional disputes and economic pressures have not generated unified opposition capable of forcing rapid change. With roughly six months left in the window, the absence of coordinated external backing for regime opponents or fresh triggers for mass upheaval sustains expectations of continuity.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · ОновленоТак
$19,896,764 Обс.
$19,896,764 Обс.
Так
$19,896,764 Обс.
$19,896,764 Обс.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Ринок відкрито: Nov 3, 2025, 6:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's survival through the 2026 conflict with the United States and Israel, including the February assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and a subsequent leadership transition to his son Mojtaba, underpins the 87.5% trader consensus against collapse before 2027. Security forces remained cohesive during 2025–early 2026 protests, enabling a violent crackdown and internet restrictions that suppressed unrest by spring without significant defections or elite splits. An April ceasefire and renewed diplomatic channels have lowered escalation risks, while factional disputes and economic pressures have not generated unified opposition capable of forcing rapid change. With roughly six months left in the window, the absence of coordinated external backing for regime opponents or fresh triggers for mass upheaval sustains expectations of continuity.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
Обережно з зовнішніми посиланнями.
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