The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience after February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials underpins the 98.3% implied probability against collapse by September 30. Security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, maintained control through January protests met with lethal crackdowns, economic pressures, and infrastructure damage, preventing mass defections or territorial fragmentation. Recent August 2026 diplomatic talks with intermediaries on reopening the Strait of Hormuz reflect continued regime functionality rather than imminent breakdown. Historical patterns of elite cohesion and suppression of opposition have reinforced trader consensus that structural barriers to rapid regime change remain high through the resolution window. Sudden leadership fractures or coordinated internal uprisings could still shift dynamics, though none are evident in current reporting.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · ОновленоWill the Iranian regime fall by September 30?
$1,554,152 Обс.
$1,554,152 Обс.
$1,554,152 Обс.
$1,554,152 Обс.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Ринок відкрито: Jun 29, 2026, 7:51 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The Iranian regime's demonstrated resilience after February 2026 U.S.-Israeli strikes that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials underpins the 98.3% implied probability against collapse by September 30. Security forces, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, maintained control through January protests met with lethal crackdowns, economic pressures, and infrastructure damage, preventing mass defections or territorial fragmentation. Recent August 2026 diplomatic talks with intermediaries on reopening the Strait of Hormuz reflect continued regime functionality rather than imminent breakdown. Historical patterns of elite cohesion and suppression of opposition have reinforced trader consensus that structural barriers to rapid regime change remain high through the resolution window. Sudden leadership fractures or coordinated internal uprisings could still shift dynamics, though none are evident in current reporting.
Експериментальне резюме, згенероване ШІ з посиланням на дані Polymarket. Це не торгова порада і не впливає на вирішення цього ринку. · Оновлено


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