This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Russia's ongoing nuclear-capable missile tests at the Kura range, conducted from May 6-10 ahead of Victory Day on May 9, have not triggered market shifts, as traders distinguish these from actual nuclear detonation tests last performed in 1990. Low implied probabilities—8% for a test by December 31, 2026—reflect Russia's 2023 CTBT ratification withdrawal, November 2025 order to prepare test proposals at Novaya Zemlya, and February 2026 New START expiry, yet persistent de facto global test ban adherence amid Ukraine escalations. April Sarmat ICBM trials and Pentagon's May 1 nuclear arsenal report sustain modernization signals without crossing to explosive testing, facing diplomatic barriers from U.S., NATO sanctions, and international norms. Any verified detonation or arms control breakdown could rapidly alter trader consensus.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Russia's ongoing nuclear-capable missile tests at the Kura range, conducted from May 6-10 ahead of Victory Day on May 9, have not triggered market shifts, as traders distinguish these from actual nuclear detonation tests last performed in 1990. Low implied probabilities—8% for a test by December 31, 2026—reflect Russia's 2023 CTBT ratification withdrawal, November 2025 order to prepare test proposals at Novaya Zemlya, and February 2026 New START expiry, yet persistent de facto global test ban adherence amid Ukraine escalations. April Sarmat ICBM trials and Pentagon's May 1 nuclear arsenal report sustain modernization signals without crossing to explosive testing, facing diplomatic barriers from U.S., NATO sanctions, and international norms. Any verified detonation or arms control breakdown could rapidly alter trader consensus.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano
May 6 2026
Kyiv Post reports Russia is preparing a “doomsday” Sarmat ICBM test around Victory Day, yet satellite‑track data show the launch was scrubbed, reinforcing market belief that no
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%4%
Kyiv Post reports Russia is preparing a “doomsday” Sarmat ICBM test around Victory Day, yet satellite‑track data show the launch was scrubbed, reinforcing market belief that no nuclear blast will occur
May 6 2026
Russian Defence Ministry announces a scheduled ICBM‑capable missile test at the Kura range (May 6‑10), explicitly stating it is not a nuclear test, further dampening expectations
September 30, 2026 dips to 4%1%
Russian Defence Ministry announces a scheduled ICBM‑capable missile test at the Kura range (May 6‑10), explicitly stating it is not a nuclear test, further dampening expectations
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia (or the U.S.) resumes nuclear testing, other nations will follow, heightening concerns about a test‑free period
September 30, 2026 dips to 5%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia (or the U.S.) resumes nuclear testing, other nations will follow, heightening concerns about a test‑free period
Apr 30 2026
Russian Ministry of Defense announces missile‑test window at the Kura range in Kamchatka from May 6‑10, but explicitly states the tests are “conventional” and no nuclear devices
December 31, 2026 dips to 12%1%
Russian Ministry of Defense announces missile‑test window at the Kura range in Kamchatka from May 6‑10, but explicitly states the tests are “conventional” and no nuclear devices will be used
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 22 2026
Congressional Research Service report cites the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment confirming Russia’s “multiple failed tests” of new systems, reinforcing market doubts
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Congressional Research Service report cites the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment confirming Russia’s “multiple failed tests” of new systems, reinforcing market doubts
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Mar 28 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, noting repeated launch failures and no confirmed
December 31, 2026 drops to 38%12%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, noting repeated launch failures and no confirmed detonation
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Russia's ongoing nuclear-capable missile tests at the Kura range, conducted from May 6-10 ahead of Victory Day on May 9, have not triggered market shifts, as traders distinguish these from actual nuclear detonation tests last performed in 1990. Low implied probabilities—8% for a test by December 31, 2026—reflect Russia's 2023 CTBT ratification withdrawal, November 2025 order to prepare test proposals at Novaya Zemlya, and February 2026 New START expiry, yet persistent de facto global test ban adherence amid Ukraine escalations. April Sarmat ICBM trials and Pentagon's May 1 nuclear arsenal report sustain modernization signals without crossing to explosive testing, facing diplomatic barriers from U.S., NATO sanctions, and international norms. Any verified detonation or arms control breakdown could rapidly alter trader consensus.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Russia's ongoing nuclear-capable missile tests at the Kura range, conducted from May 6-10 ahead of Victory Day on May 9, have not triggered market shifts, as traders distinguish these from actual nuclear detonation tests last performed in 1990. Low implied probabilities—8% for a test by December 31, 2026—reflect Russia's 2023 CTBT ratification withdrawal, November 2025 order to prepare test proposals at Novaya Zemlya, and February 2026 New START expiry, yet persistent de facto global test ban adherence amid Ukraine escalations. April Sarmat ICBM trials and Pentagon's May 1 nuclear arsenal report sustain modernization signals without crossing to explosive testing, facing diplomatic barriers from U.S., NATO sanctions, and international norms. Any verified detonation or arms control breakdown could rapidly alter trader consensus.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano
May 6 2026
Kyiv Post reports Russia is preparing a “doomsday” Sarmat ICBM test around Victory Day, yet satellite‑track data show the launch was scrubbed, reinforcing market belief that no
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%4%
Kyiv Post reports Russia is preparing a “doomsday” Sarmat ICBM test around Victory Day, yet satellite‑track data show the launch was scrubbed, reinforcing market belief that no nuclear blast will occur
May 6 2026
Russian Defence Ministry announces a scheduled ICBM‑capable missile test at the Kura range (May 6‑10), explicitly stating it is not a nuclear test, further dampening expectations
September 30, 2026 dips to 4%1%
Russian Defence Ministry announces a scheduled ICBM‑capable missile test at the Kura range (May 6‑10), explicitly stating it is not a nuclear test, further dampening expectations
May 4 2026
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the
December 31, 2026 drops to 4%5%
Polymarket analysis notes that, despite Yars drills and bomber patrols, there is “absent CTBTO seismic data” and “Kremlin restraint statements,” further depressing the test‑probability outlook
May 1 2026
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Congressional Research Service report reiterates that Russia’s “modernization” is hampered by failed tests and that the New START treaty has just expired – The report underscored that, despite the treaty’s lapse, Russia publicly pledged to continue abiding by its limits, reinforcing trader sentiment that a test was unlikely before Sept 30.
May 1 2026
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
December 31, 2026 dips to 9%1%
U.S. Congress receives the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment stating Russia has suffered “multiple failed tests of new systems,” reinforcing expectations of continued test moratorium
Apr 30 2026
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
December 31, 2026 dips to 10%2%
The Russian‑held Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant loses external power for an hour on the 40th anniversary of Chernobyl, raising safety concerns but providing no evidence of a test
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about
September 30, 2026 dips to 8%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would spark a cascade of worldwide testing – The UN‑backed warning amplified concerns about escalation, leading markets to further discount the probability of a Russian test in the near term.
Apr 30 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia (or the U.S.) resumes nuclear testing, other nations will follow, heightening concerns about a test‑free period
September 30, 2026 dips to 5%1%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia (or the U.S.) resumes nuclear testing, other nations will follow, heightening concerns about a test‑free period
Apr 30 2026
Russian Ministry of Defense announces missile‑test window at the Kura range in Kamchatka from May 6‑10, but explicitly states the tests are “conventional” and no nuclear devices
December 31, 2026 dips to 12%1%
Russian Ministry of Defense announces missile‑test window at the Kura range in Kamchatka from May 6‑10, but explicitly states the tests are “conventional” and no nuclear devices will be used
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 22 2026
Congressional Research Service report cites the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment confirming Russia’s “multiple failed tests” of new systems, reinforcing market doubts
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Congressional Research Service report cites the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment confirming Russia’s “multiple failed tests” of new systems, reinforcing market doubts
Apr 21 2026
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
UN chief Rafael Grossi and CTBTO executive Robert Floyd warn that a Russian nuclear test would trigger a “spiral” of further tests, underscoring Kremlin restraint
Apr 18 2026
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
Russian Foreign Ministry publicly rejects any possibility of using nuclear weapons in Ukraine – The statement was interpreted as a broader signal of restraint on nuclear activities, contributing to the continued decline in the “Yes”
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Apr 2 2026
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
December 31, 2026 plunges to 12%38%
Russia conducts Yars ICBM drills in Siberia, but no warhead‑test activity is reported
Mar 28 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the September deadline
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems – A March testimony cited in the 2026 Annual Threat Assessment warned that Russia’s recent attempts at modernizing its arsenal had repeatedly failed, prompting traders to slash the perceived likelihood of a test before the end‑September deadline.
Mar 15 2026
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, noting repeated launch failures and no confirmed
December 31, 2026 drops to 38%12%
U.S. intelligence briefing flags “multiple failed tests” of new Russian nuclear systems in its 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, noting repeated launch failures and no confirmed detonation
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Często zadawane pytania
"Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?" to rynek prognoz na Polymarket z 6 możliwymi wynikami, gdzie traderzy kupują i sprzedają udziały na podstawie tego, co ich zdaniem się wydarzy. Obecny wiodący wynik to "31 grudnia 2026" z 8%, za nim "30 września 2026" z 5%. Ceny odzwierciedlają zbiorowe prawdopodobieństwa w czasie rzeczywistym. Na przykład udział wyceniony na 8¢ implikuje, że rynek zbiorowo przypisuje 8% szansy na ten wynik. Te kursy zmieniają się ciągle, gdy traderzy reagują na nowe informacje. Udziały w poprawnym wyniku można wymienić na $1 za sztukę po rozstrzygnięciu rynku.
Na dzień dzisiejszy "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?" wygenerował $1.4 million łącznego wolumenu od uruchomienia rynku Nov 5, 2025. Ten poziom aktywności handlowej odzwierciedla silne zaangażowanie społeczności Polymarket i pomaga zapewnić, że bieżące kursy są informowane przez głęboką pulę uczestników rynku. Możesz śledzić ruchy cen na żywo i handlować na dowolny wynik bezpośrednio na tej stronie.
Aby handlować na "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?", przeglądaj 6 dostępnych wyników na tej stronie. Każdy wynik wyświetla bieżącą cenę reprezentującą implikowane prawdopodobieństwo rynku. Aby zająć pozycję, wybierz wynik, który uważasz za najbardziej prawdopodobny, wybierz "Tak", aby handlować na jego korzyść, lub "Nie", aby handlować przeciw niemu, wpisz kwotę i kliknij "Handluj". Jeśli wybrany wynik okaże się poprawny, Twoje udziały "Tak" wypłacą $1 za sztukę. Jeśli jest niepoprawny, wypłacą $0. Możesz też sprzedać swoje udziały w dowolnym momencie przed rozstrzygnięciem.
To szeroko otwarty rynek. Obecnym liderem dla "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?" jest "31 grudnia 2026" z zaledwie 8%, a za nim "30 września 2026" z 5%. Brak wyniku z wyraźną większością — traderzy widzą to jako wysoce niepewne, co może stwarzać unikalne okazje handlowe. Te kursy aktualizują się w czasie rzeczywistym, więc dodaj tę stronę do zakładek, aby obserwować ewolucję prawdopodobieństw.
Zasady rozstrzygania "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?" określają dokładnie, co musi się wydarzyć, aby każdy wynik został ogłoszony zwycięzcą — w tym oficjalne źródła danych używane do ustalenia wyniku. Możesz przejrzeć pełne kryteria rozstrzygania w sekcji "Zasady" na tej stronie nad komentarzami. Zalecamy dokładne zapoznanie się z zasadami przed handlem, ponieważ określają one precyzyjne warunki, przypadki graniczne i źródła regulujące rozstrzyganie tego rynku.
Tak. Nie musisz handlować, aby być na bieżąco. Ta strona służy jako tracker na żywo dla "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?". Prawdopodobieństwa wyników aktualizują się w czasie rzeczywistym z każdą nową transakcją. Możesz dodać tę stronę do zakładek i sprawdzić sekcję komentarzy, aby zobaczyć, co myślą inni traderzy. Możesz też użyć filtrów zakresu czasu na wykresie, aby zobaczyć, jak kursy zmieniały się w czasie. To darmowe, działające w czasie rzeczywistym okno na to, czego rynek oczekuje.
Kursy Polymarket ustalane są przez prawdziwych traderów stawiających prawdziwe pieniądze za swoimi przekonaniami, co zwykle prowadzi do trafnych prognoz. Z $1.4 million wolumenu na "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?", ceny te agregują zbiorową wiedzę i zaangażowanie tysięcy uczestników — często przewyższając sondaże, prognozy ekspertów i tradycyjne badania. Rynki prognoz jak Polymarket mają silną historię trafności, szczególnie gdy wydarzenia zbliżają się do rozstrzygnięcia. Na przykład, Polymarket ma miesięczny wynik trafności 94%. Najnowsze statystyki trafności prognoz Polymarket znajdziesz na stronie trafności na Polymarket.
Aby złożyć swoje pierwsze zlecenie na "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?", zarejestruj darmowe konto Polymarket i doładuj je kryptowalutą, kartą kredytową lub debetową albo przelewem bankowym. Po doładowaniu konta wróć na tę stronę, wybierz wynik, na który chcesz handlować, wpisz kwotę i kliknij "Handluj". Jeśli jesteś nowy w rynkach prognoz, kliknij link "Jak to działa" na górze dowolnej strony Polymarket, aby zobaczyć szybki przewodnik krok po kroku.
Na Polymarket cena każdego wyniku reprezentuje implikowane prawdopodobieństwo rynku. Cena 8¢ za "31 grudnia 2026" na rynku "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?" oznacza, że traderzy zbiorowo wierzą, iż istnieje w przybliżeniu 8% szansy na to, że "31 grudnia 2026" będzie poprawnym wynikiem. Jeśli kupisz udziały "Tak" po 8¢ i wynik jest poprawny, otrzymasz $1.00 za udział — zysk 92¢ za udział. Jeśli jest niepoprawny, te udziały są warte $0.
Planowana data zakończenia rynku "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?" minęła, ale rynek nie został jeszcze oficjalnie rozstrzygnięty. Data zakończenia wskazuje, kiedy oczekuje się, że dane wydarzenie nastąpi lub stanie się poznawalne. Nie jest to moment zakończenia handlu. Rynek pozostaje otwarty do handlu aż do formalnego rozstrzygnięcia wyniku. Możesz nadal kupować, sprzedawać lub zamykać swoją pozycję w oczekiwaniu na rozstrzygnięcie. Sprawdź tracker statusu rozstrzygnięcia i sekcję "Zasady" na tej stronie.
Rynek "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?" ma rosnącą dyskusję z 7 komentarzami, gdzie traderzy dzielą się swoimi analizami, debatują nad wynikami i omawiają najnowsze wydarzenia. Przewiń w dół do sekcji komentarzy, aby przeczytać, co myślą inni uczestnicy. Możesz też filtrować według "Najwięksi posiadacze", aby zobaczyć, na co postawiły największe portfele rynku, lub sprawdzić zakładkę "Aktywność" dla transmisji transakcji na żywo.
Polymarket to największy na świecie rynek prognoz, na którym możesz być na bieżąco i czerpać zyski ze swojej wiedzy o wydarzeniach w świecie rzeczywistym. Traderzy kupują i sprzedają udziały w wynikach tematów od polityki i wyborów po kryptowaluty, finanse, sport, technologię i kulturę, w tym rynki takie jak "Próba nuklearna Rosji do...?". Ceny odzwierciedlają zbiorowe prawdopodobieństwa w czasie rzeczywistym poparte finansowym zaangażowaniem, często dostarczając szybsze i trafniejsze sygnały niż sondaże, komentatorzy czy tradycyjne badania.
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