Iran's Tehran FIR (OIIX) has remained only partially open since major US-Israeli strikes and Iranian missile retaliation in March 2026, with the western sector staying heavily restricted due to ongoing air defense alerts, degraded radar, and EASA advisories against operations at all altitudes. Partial eastern reopenings for limited overflights above FL285 occurred in June 2026 amid fragile ceasefires, but renewed military activity prompted continued avoidance warnings through July and into August. Temporary near-full closures, such as the hours-long shutdown in January 2026 tied to US strike threats, reflect how escalation risks and military exercises drive authorities to prioritize airspace control, directly influencing trader assessments of full closure probability before key resolution windows. Diplomatic stalls and potential strikes remain primary near-term catalysts.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · ZaktualizowanoIran full airspace closure by...?
$8,459,372 Wol.
August 31
6%
September 30
16%
December 31
32%
$8,459,372 Wol.
August 31
6%
September 30
16%
December 31
32%
A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).
Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).
Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.
Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.
Rynek otwarty: Jun 25, 2026, 7:21 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).
Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).
Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.
Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Iran's Tehran FIR (OIIX) has remained only partially open since major US-Israeli strikes and Iranian missile retaliation in March 2026, with the western sector staying heavily restricted due to ongoing air defense alerts, degraded radar, and EASA advisories against operations at all altitudes. Partial eastern reopenings for limited overflights above FL285 occurred in June 2026 amid fragile ceasefires, but renewed military activity prompted continued avoidance warnings through July and into August. Temporary near-full closures, such as the hours-long shutdown in January 2026 tied to US strike threats, reflect how escalation risks and military exercises drive authorities to prioritize airspace control, directly influencing trader assessments of full closure probability before key resolution windows. Diplomatic stalls and potential strikes remain primary near-term catalysts.
Eksperymentalne podsumowanie AI odwołujące się do danych Polymarket. To nie jest porada handlowa i nie ma wpływu na rozstrzyganie tego rynku. · Zaktualizowano



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